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INTRODUCTION

In this Article, protests are analyzed, from both an economic and
legal perspective, as a decentralized mechanism for oversight of the
competitive procurement process. Attention focuses on the protest
process at the General Services Administration Board of Contract
Appeals (hereinafter "the Board" or "GSBCA"). It is argued that protests are an effective means of deterring and correcting agency problems among procurement personnel and, consequently, accomplishing
the procurement objectives of the government. Drawbacks of the
protest process are identified, explanations are offered for the existence of these negative side effects, and solutions are proposed. In
addition, protests are compared to centralized oversight methods, i.e.,
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audits. Furthermore, we asseiss the trade-offs between granting greater
decision-making discretion to procurement personnel and controlling
agency problems.
I. DEcENTRALZED PROCUREMENT OVERSIGHT
Despite the enormous significance of government procurement of
goods and services in the American economy,1 public contract law
has received relatively little attention from law and economics scholars.2 We take a small step toward filling this gap by offering an
analysis of public contract awards and decentralized oversight. We
argue that a primary purpose of oversight is to control the discretion
of government officials who make contract awards, since their incentives are often poorly aligned with the interests of taxpayers Oversight induces procurement officials (hereinafter "POs") with distorted
incentives to make purchase decisions that are more consistent with
the objectives of the government.
The term "decentralized" is used to connote a regulatory scheme
that relies on private enforcement. In contrast, "centralized" regulatory
activity relies on government officials. Our attention in this Article is
divided between the general question of the efficacy of decentralized
oversight of public contract awards and the particular question of the
efficacy of the General Services Administration Board of Contract
Appeals bid protest process, as applied to federal computer and telecommunications procurements. 4 The GSBCA bid protest process represents a major innovation in procurement oversight. Prospective or
actual bidders with a direct economic interest in a contract award are
permitted to challenge the actions of a procurement official before a
quasi-judicial body with substantial powers to remedy violations of
procurement statutes and regulations.5
Economic analysis of decentralized procurement oversight is
1. All levels of government procurement account for about 10% of the GNP or
approximately $450 billion per year. STEvEN KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBuC MANAGEMENT (1990).

2. For example, law and economics textbooks that devote at least one chapter to
private contract law are entirely silent on the subject of public contract law. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1986); WERNER ZUI HIRSCH, LAW AND
ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (1988); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS UI.EN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS (1989).
3. See infra Section I.B. and accompanying notes (discussing barriers to the implementation of efficient procurement).
4. See 40 U.S.C. § 759(f) (1991).
5. See infra Section II.C. and accompanying notes (discussing the protest process).
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facilitated by the recognition that it is an example of enforcement by
a private attorney general. The notion that private parties should be
encouraged to litigate to advance public goals that coincide with their
private interests has long been recognized in areas such as antitrust,
securities law and derivative actions.6 The courts have affirned the
utility of private attorneys general in the procurement context7 and
Congress consciously chose to bolster computer procurement oversight8
by creating a forum for private attorneys general at the GSBCA.
Legal scholars, while recognizing the deterrent and corrective value of
private enforcement, have been critical of its use for several reasons.9
They have complained of the tendency for excessive litigation,"° nuisance suits" and strategic misuse of the courts. 2 Similar problems
afflict the protest process, but we argue that these negative side effects can be minimized through appropriate intervention.
Critics of decentralized oversight must defend the alternatives of
no regulation or centralized regulatiol.. The absence of oversight of
the contract award process seems unpalatable because of the tendency
of procurement officials to respond to inappropriate incentives and to
make inefficient awards. 3 Traditional centralized oversight relies on
6. See John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Scanwell Lab., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The
Scanwel court believed that agencies had to be responsible for their actions when awarding
contracts. "The public interest in preventing the granting of contracts through arbitrary or
capricious action can properly be vindicated through a suit brought by one who suffers injury
as a result of the illegal activity, but the suit itself is brought in the public interest by one
acting essentially as a 'private attorney general.'" Id. at 864.
8. See Julie Research Lab., Inc., GSBCA No. 8070-P-R, 86-2 B.C.A., (CCH)
18,881
(1986) (stating that "the legislative history of Section 2713 of the CICA [Competition in
Contracting Act] makes it very clear that the intent of Congress in this provision was to encourage private enforcement of the laws and regulations mandating the acquisition of general
purpose automatic data processing equipment and services through full and open competition . .

").

9. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 670 (noting that criticism of private enforcement has
increased over the last decade).
10. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit
In a Costly Legal System, 11 3. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982); Louis Kaplow, Private Versus
Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STuD. 371 (1986).
11. See D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are Brought for Their
Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to
Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988).
12. William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition,
28 LL. & EcON. 247 (1985).
13. See Infra Section I.B. and accompanying notes (discussing barriers to the implemen-
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an auditor who is "distant" from the regulated activity. This "distance" has two implications. First, the auditor is poorly informed.
Second, the auditor lacks the keen motivation of profits, which drives
the behavior of the protester.
One key problem with the current protest process at the GSBCA
is the fact that unsupervised settlements are possible. Certainly, settlements that involve socially beneficial revisions of a bid solicitation do
not need to be monitored, but cash payments by a procuring agency
or named awardee to a protesting firm are problematic. Since taxpayers are not represented at the settlement negotiation, many flawed
procurements are currently left unaltered when a cash settlement occurs. Outside of circumventing the private attorney general role of the
protester, the possibility of unregulated cash settlements greatly enhances the organization and maintenance of collusive agreements and
bidder conspiracies.
This Article is organized in three parts. The first part presents a
theoretical analysis of private attorneys general as overseers of the
procurement process. We identify factors that create a need for oversight, describe the costs and benefits of oversight by protests and
compare it to the alternative of audits. In the second part, we explore
the implementation of the decentralized oversight in the federal computer market. The issues addressed in this section include settlements,
bidder collusion, the role of intervenors and standing. In addition, we
assess the trade-offs between granting greater decision-making discretion to procurement personnel and controlling agency problems. In the
third part, we examine specific policy issues, including proposals
recently put forward by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and
the Department of the Treasury for revision of the protest process,
and offer recommendations for intervention.
A.

What is a Good Procurement?

The history of federal procurement law demonstrates a concern
for three policy goals, namely: equity (in the sense of fair access of
bidders to the procurement); integrity (i.e., no corruption); and efficiency (meaning the selection of a vendor who offers the greatest
difference between gross value and cost). 4 In response to the corruption and favoritism marking negotiated contracts early in the 19th

tation of efficient procurement).
14. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 11.
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century, Congress, in 1845, required the use of sealed bidding.' s In
the 1940s, a court commenting on procurement law noted that "the
purpose of these statutes... is to give all persons equal right to
compete for Government Contracts; to prevent unjust favoritism, or
collusion or fraud [in awarding government contracts]; and thus to
secure for the Government the benefits which arise from competition. 1 8
Our concern in this Article is primarily with the efficiency
goal.'" The issues of integrity and equity are discussed only to the
extent that they overlap with efficiency concerns. We suspect that
careful analysis would show that in the case of government procurement there is little tension between the three goals. To help the reader better understand the economics of procurement, the rest of this
section is devoted to a procurement catechism. To be concrete, we
will illustrate this discussion with the case of a federal computer
procurement, which will be analyzed in detail in Part II.
What is the government's efficiency goal? When a federal agency solicits bids for a new computer system, a number of vendors will
typically submit bids that provide a description of their products, the
cost to the government and other important information (e.g., warranties and delivery dates). With all but the simplest of procurements the
government is not concerned solely with cost. The reason is that each
of the different products is differentially suited to accomplish the
computational tasks of the procuring agency. Some products may be
fast. Others may be slower but more reliable. Based upon the demand
for computational services of the procuring agency, a monetary "value" can be placed on each bundle of products offered by each firm.
Clearly, the government does not necessarily want the procuring agency to select the firm offering the highest value, since this firm's bid
might come with an extremely high price.
What criterion does the government want a federal agency to use
in selecting an awardee? The simplest possible criterion that captures

15. See FRANK M. ALSTON ET AL, CONTRACTING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 59
(2d ed. 1988).

16. United States v. Brookridge Farm, Inc., 111 F.2d 461, 463 (10th Cir. 1940).
17. The primacy of maximizing value of a procurement for the government is reflected
by the following comment by the Board. "Mhe purpose of the protest process is to assure
that in federal agency procurements, not only are vendors treated fairly, but also-of greater
importance in crafting relief-that the agency ultimately makes an award against the bid or
proposal that is most advantageous to the United States.- SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc.
GSBCA No. 10864-P, 91-1 B.C.A., (CCH) 23,464, at 117,718 (1990).
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many of the most important issues associated with any procurement is
to select the firm offering the highest "surplus." The surplus to the
government in a particular firm's bid is the difference between the
value of the products offered by that firm and the cost to the government for the firm to provide those products. The complicated part of
evaluating the surplus offered by a given firm in its bid is the determination of the value of the products that the firm will provide if it
is selected as the awardee. Compared to value, cost is trivial to ascertain.
Are factors other than surplus relevant in designing an optimal
procurement process? Yes, the government must also consider the
more pedestrian issues of the administrative cost of the award process
and the cost of oversight.
How should the government design the award process? In most
cases, competitive sealed bidding"8 is the preferred method 9 of
government procurement.2" Ideally, bids should be evaluated by a
method of scoring the various attributes of the proposed computer
system and weighing the technical merit of a proposal against its
cost. The firm achieving the highest score should be awarded the
contract.
Should federal procurement practices diverge from private sector
practices? Critics of government procurement by competitive bidding
argue that such practices are much less common in the private sector
and, therefore, government reliance on competitive procurements is
suspect." There are two factors that account for our advocacy of
competitive procurements. First, compared to their private sector
counterparts, government buyers are often not well informed about the
product that they are buying. This is because government personnel

18. See R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON.
LrrElAxRE 699 (surveying the economic literature on auctions).
19. There are situations in which sole source procurements are unavoidable, such as

when purchasing from a monopoly or when purchasing under extreme urgency, as in war
time.
20. In the economics literature, there has been extensive discussion of what type of
auction (oral or sealed bid, ascending or descending, etc.) is optimal in various circumstances.
See, e.g., Paul R. Milgrom & Robert L Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089, 1122 (1982) (discussing auction design with affiliated bidder
valuations and bidder risk aversion); Daniel A. Graham & Robert C. Marshall, Collusive
Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions, 95 J. POL ECON. 1217,
1239 (1987) (discussing auction design with colluding bidders). We gloss over this difficult

issue here because, whatever its resolution, the following analysis will almost certainly not be
significantly affected.
21. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 1, at 62.
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are less experienced and because many government purchases involve
idiosyncratic goods that are infrequently purchased. Competitive
procurements help overcome the relative ignorance of buyers since
informed sellers must compete against one another. Second, the formality of a competitive procurement is helpful in limiting the use of
relatively uninformed discretion by government officials. In the public
sector, the lack of profit incentives and various institutional constraints limit the power of incentive contracts to align the interests of
a procurement official closely with those of the government. In such
an environment, a competitive procurement is an appropriate device
for alleviating the problem of abuse of discretion.
How can the government best exploit its monopsony power?
Since the government is often the only or the largest buyer in a particular market, it has a greater ability to bargain for a high surplus
procurement than do smaller buyers. One way to utilize that power in
sealed bidding is to post a reserve or, in other words, credibly threaten not to purchase from any vendor.22 A reserve policy establishes a
minimum level of surplus or score that the best proposal must offer
in order to receive an award. Simply put, beating the reserve is a
necessary condition for winning an award. The effect of the reserve is
to force vendors to bid more aggressively to ensure that they exceed
the reserve.' When a reserve has been optimally set, the potential
ex post inefficiency from making no award is more than offset, in an
expected sense, by the higher surplus generated from more aggressive
bidding. The intuition in support of a reserve policy is encapsulated
in the following bromide: If you've never walked away from a deal
that could have been made, you're not bargaining hard enough.
Should the government restrict competition when it is trying to
buy a product? Normally, the answer is no. As the number of bidders
rises, competition increases and the purchase price falls. Nevertheless,
there are often products in the relevant market that poorly match the
preferences of a procuring agency. It is a waste of resources for ill22. The government may cancel when no bidder has offered a reasonable price. 48
C.F.R. § 15.608(b)(1) (1990). One way to accomplish this is through the use of a reserve

price as discussed in the auction/procurement theory literature. See Milgrom & Weber, supra
note 20. However, it has been demonstrated that in certain environments the use of a reserve
can be counterproductive. See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions with
Entry, 23 ECON. LETERs 343, 347 (1987).
23. A reserve is particularly effeative when there are a small number of bidders. This is
typically the case in computer procurement. In the nine cases studied by Kehnan there were
38 bidders or an average of 4.2 bidders per procurement. See KELMAN, supra note I, at 10983.
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matched firms to prepare bids24 and for procurement personnel to
spend time evaluating these bids.' For example, if a federal agency
wants a local area network of PCs for word processing, it does not
make much sense to invite or allow bids from a vendor offering
electric typewriters."
What criterion should the government want to use in restricting
participation in a procurement? Theoretically, the government should
consider all possible permutations of bidders to exclude and then only
include the set of bidders that maximizes expected surplus. Roughly
speaking, if the expected surplus that a firm could offer the government is insufficient to cover the costs of preparing and evaluating the
bid, then it should be excluded.'
How should the bidders be compensated? 28 An optimal sealed
bid mechanism would compensate all bidders for their bid preparation
costs,29 compensate the winner for production costs, and provide the
winner with a profit related to its advantage over its next best rival.
The profit earned by the winner should depend on the gap between
its bid and the second best bid because that would provide an incen-

24. The preparation of a bid proposal may cost a vendor more than one million dollars.
See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 22. Benchmark tests are expensive for bidders. The Navy has
experimented with reimbursing vendors for benchmark testing expenses. See Jerome S. Gabig
& Richard C. Bean, A Primer on Federal Information Systems Acquisitions: Part 7Wo of a
Two-Part Article, 17 PuB. CONT. L.L 553, 580 (1987).
25. In an Army procurement for an item costing $11,000, the agency spent $5,000
handling the over 100 bidders that responded to the IFB (Invitation for Bids). See JACQUES
S. GANSLER, AFFORDING DEFENSE 182 n.94 (1989). Evaluation also takes a lot of time and
energy for procurement personnel. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 24.
26. A second reason for restricting competition is to reward investments in product
development by bidders. The government often cannot directly measure or reward the effort
of bidders who do research and development to tailor a product to the government's specifications. See GANSLER, supra note 25, at 181 (stating that restricting the number of bidders in
a procurement may raise the government's surplus because the smaller number of bidders are
likely to produce higher quality proposals).
27. The typical mechanism for exclusion is the mandatory specifications in the RFP
(Request for Proposals) or IFB. See infra Section ll.B. and accompanying notes. Such a
method of generating exclusions is a coarser filter than the theoretical ideal, but it achieves
the basic goal.
28. The analysis here draws from the work of Robert C. Marshall et al., Delegated
Procurement and the Protest Process, Duke University mimeo (1990), the framework of which
modifies the work of Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, 6 MATHEMATICS OF
OPERATIONS RES. 58 (1981), to a procurement setting that permits the incorporation of
agency problems in the objective function of the POs.
29. Compensation for bid preparation costs should be limited to "reasonable" expenditures, just as is done in cases in which attorneys' fees are awarded. This limitation would
deter excessive expenditures on bid preparations.
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five for the winner to bid more aggressively and to provide a higher
surplus product."0 The requirement that all bidders be compensated
for their bid preparation costs may seem surprising.3 1 If preparation
costs are not reimbursed, the entry decision by a firm is based upon
a comparison of expected profit and entry cost.32 From the
government's perspective, the decision should be based on a comparison of the increase in expected surplus that the firm will generate to
the bid preparation and handling cost. The government should follow
this policy to gain control over the number of bidders participating in
a procurement and promote participation by more bidders when that
is appropriate.
B.

Barriers to the Implementation of Efficient
Procurement (with an Example)

The optimal procurement mechanism described in Section L.A
relies on sealed bidding to remove discretion from procurement officials that derives from an unstructured purchasing process. In the case
of relatively homogeneous commodities, it is successful.33 In contrast, an optimal procurement mechanism for heterogeneous goods
allows procurement officials to retain discretion to determine optimal
exclusions, to formulate a method of scoring product attributes, and to
evaluate the products. It cannot be properly implemented unless procurement personnel are competent and are provided the correct incentives by their agencies. While we believe that procurement officials
are generally honest and well-meaning, the training that they receive
is often inadequate, and serious incentive problems are created by the

30. If no other bidder beats the reserve, then the winner's profit depends on its advantage over the reserve.
31. The Department of Defense [hereinafter "DOD"] is authorized to bear the cost of
testing and evaluation for small businesses where the Government anticipates savings -through
competition. See Gabig & Bean, supra note 24, at 581. Benchmark testing is expensive for
the vendors, and some government agencies have experimented with reimbursing vendors. See
Id. at 580.

32. Shane Greenstein, The Market for Bids: Determining Procedures in Federal Mainframe Computer Procurement 4 (June 1990) (unpublished manuscript, available at the University of Illinois Department of Economics).
33. Although abuse of discretion in the award process is not a problem with homogeneous goods, collusion and improper specification of the government's needs are still problems. See, e.g., William Kovacic, The Antitrust Government Contracts Handbook 32-34 (Oct.
1989) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing bid rigging in highway construction contracts);

Mary K. Marvel & Howard P. Marvel, Contracting Problems and Public Sector Organization
9-12 (Sept. 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing unreasonable specifications in gov-

ernment cafeteria contracts).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss1/1

10

Marshall et al.: The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procureme
1991]

PROCUREMENTOVERSIGHT BY PROTEST

delegation of procurement authority to agencies. In this section we
describe these incentive problems and the ways in which they are
manifested through the exercise of discretion by agency procurement
personnel.
Oversight of the procurement process is needed because, for
various reasons, the government's objectives are not shared by the
procuring agency or the procurement personnel who administer the
process. In the vernacular of economics, there is a "principal-agent"
problem.3' The government (the principal) wants the procurement
official (its agent) to undertake a task on its behalf. The problem
stems from the fact that the agent does not have the same objectives
as the principal, and some aspects of the agent's behavior cannot be
monitored.35 Throughout the text, we will refer to this misalignment
of objectives as the "agency problem." The most serious problem is
reward systems that do not induce high levels of effort. There are
also incentive problems relating to favoritism and a bias toward excessively sophisticated technology in procurement decisions.
The first step in the analysis of these problems is to understand
who makes procurement decisions. The decision-making methods are
quite similar across civilian and defense agencies. There are two lines
of authority36 in the procurement process, represented by the contracting officer and the technical (or program or project) officer. The
technical officer is responsible for assessing an agency's needs and
writing the technical portion of the solicitation. He or she also assists
in negotiations and performs the technical evaluation of proposals.
34. For an introductory discussion, see JEAN TIRoLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 35-39 (1988). For analyses of agency problems in governmental settings, see
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Proceduresas Instruments of Policy Control, 3
J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 243, 247 (1988) (stating that the problems affecting agencies
are shirking, favoritism (capture), and the problem of oligarchy, which the authors describe as
a situation in which -the peculiar political preferences of the agency override democratic
preferences"); see also Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM, J. POL.
Sci. 739, 764 (1984) (stating that the problems affecting agencies are adverse selection and
moral hazards); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN PoLrncAL ECONOMY
(1978) (stating that the government's objectives are being undermined by the corruption of
agents possessing discretionary authority).
35. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 434
(1989) (discussing the role of investigative oversight in curbing agency problems).
36. The contracting officer and the technical officer respond to two completely separate
chains of command. Gary Bliss, staff member of the Economic Analysis and Resource Planning Division of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Comments at the Conference on "Procurement Oversight" at the American Enterprise Institute
(July 1990).
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The contracting officer focuses on the contracting process, determining the non-technical features of a solicitation. The contracting officer
has primary responsibility for negotiations, evaluation, award and
administration of a contract.3 7
Technical officers are motivated to buy the best technology available, given the budget," while contracting officers want to assure
compliance with regulations and get the procurement done quickly. 9
Both groups receive meager, if any, rewards for the quality of their
business judgment. In the design of a solicitation, these parties often
act as adversaries, with the technical people pushing for higher technology and the contracting people pushing for more competition.4"
The resulting specifications and evaluation criteria emerge from a
bargain between the technical and contracting staff.4 The subjects of
the bargain are issues such as how much weight to give cost versus
technical factors in the scoring function and whether to use physical
or functional specifications.4"
It appears that the technical staff often has the upper hand in
structuring the solicitation and that they often bias procurement choices in favor of high-tech items.43 In other words, the award process
seems to place a greater weight on value and a lower Weight on cost
than would be dictated by surplus maximization.' Why this occurs

37. The technical representative, or project officer, is the individual responsible for
oversight of the contractor's technical performance. See GAO, CIVILIAN AGENCY PROCUREMENT: ImROvEmETS NEEDED IN CONTRACTnNG AND CONTRACT ADMINSTRATION 1, 9 (Sept.
5, 1989). The contracting officer reviews the specifications, negotiates the price structure and
modifies and enforces the contract. See id. at 10. The contract officer makes the final choice
after the technical experts have evaluated quality. See KEIMAN, supra note 1,at 22.

38. Major Chip Mather, assigned to the Operational Contracting Division of the Air
Force's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Comments at the Conference on "Procurement Oversight" at the American Enterprise Institute (July 1990).
39. Rex Bolton, Chief of the Authorizations and Review Office of the U.S. Army
Information Service Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency, Comments at the Conference
on "Procurement Oversight" at the American Enterprise Institute (July 1990).
40. The adversarial nature of the system is accentuated by the requirement, contained in
the Competition in Contracting Act (hereinafter "CICA"), that each agency have a "competition advocate" with the responsibility of challenging barriers to competition in agency
procurements. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.501, 6.502 (1990).
41. The contracting officer prefers functional specifications and the technical officer
prefers physical specifications. See Mather, supra note 38.
42. The contract officer and the technical officer bargain over the weight to give cost
versus quality. See generally KE.MAN, supra note 1, at 115-72.
43. For an economic analysis of the technology bias in the Department of Defense, see
William P. Rogerson, Quality versus Quantity in Military Procurement, 80 AM. ECON. REV.

83 (1990).
44. See Shane Greenstein, Did Installed Base Give an Incumbent any (Measurable)
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is an open issue. In the Department of Defense (hereinafter "DOD"),
there is a mind-set that, since human lives are at stake in military
conflicts, any expense is justified in acquiring the latest and best
technology." Whether this view is correct on the battlefield is debatable," but it is certainly troublesome when applied to the quartermaster corps. In both civilian and defense agencies, the technology
bias might also be explained by risk aversion. Technical officers
choose higher quality technology because they are sure it will get the
job done.47 Our goal in this Article is not to explain this phenomenon, but to examine its implications for efficient procurement. Consequently, we will not distinguish between the incentives and decisions
of technical officers and those of contracting officers. We simply
aggregate these personnel and treat them as if they are embodied in a
single "procurement official."
Besides the technology bias, POs often demonstrate a preference
for a familiar product or an incumbent firm .4 8 This kind of firm-

Advantages in Federal Computer Procurement? 6 (April 1990) (unpublished manuscript,
available at the University of Illinois Department of Economics) [hereinafter Greenstein,
Federal Computer Procurement]; Shane Greenstein, Going by the Book: The Costs and
Benefits of Procedural Rules in Federal Computer Procurement 7 (Dec. 1990) (unpublished
mimeo, available at the University of Illinois Department of Economics) (stating that the
capital budget for an ADPTE (automated data processing and telecommunication equipment)
purchase cannot be used for other projects, hence the marginal valuation of a dollar in the
budget is apt to be lower for an agency than for taxpayers. This affects the agency incentive
to cost minimize and exacerbates the technology bias.).
45. RICHARD A. STUBBING & RICHARD A. MENDEL, THE DEFENSE GAME: AN INSIDER
EXPLORES THE ASTONISHING REALITIES OF AMERICA'S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT 155 (1986)

(stating that "[i]n most cases, the added capability is indeed *nice to have,* but the key
question, too often ignored, is whether it is necessary when a marginally less effective system
can be bought at a far lower price.").
46. See GANSLER, supra note 25, at 43 (perhaps less so in light of the success of hightech weapon systems in the Gulf War).
47.

JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 375-76 (1980)

(suggesting that

many bureaucrats who identify their careers with particular agencies tend to be risk averse
and are primarily concerned with avoiding scandal and maintaining a quiet life). Susan RoseAckerman, the author of CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 34,

commented to one of the authors of this Article that risk aversion could also work against
the choice of high-tech items if they are new and unproven.
48. A paper studying the implications of favoritism for the design of the procurement
process is Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Auction Design and Favoritism, 9 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORGANIZATION 9 (1991) (discussing conditions under which an IFB would be preferred to an RFP even if vendors offered variable quality). Protests can be used to curb the
effect of favoritism, as reported by firms who participated in a recent survey by the American Bar Association. "Several respondents said they would protest a procurement that was
important for other reasons, such as entry into a new market or where it is important to
dislodge an incumbent contractor." Bid Protest Committee Rep., The Protest Experience Under
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specific favoritism is well known in procurement circles and has led
to such expressions as, "No one was ever fired for buying from
IBM."49 Favoritism is generated in many ways-some benign and
others pernicious. An expectation of future employment50 with a particular firm or friendship with the marketing representatives of a fin
lead to favoritism. So do the idiosyncratic preferences of the technical
staff for a particular product. Alternatively, a PO who is satisfied
with a particular product or vendor may find evaluation of alternatives to be costly in terms of effort, while realizing little, if any, of
the gains from the inclusion of other firms in the procurement. The
consequent lack of evaluation of new products will lead the PO to
select an awardee from a strict subset (the favored firms) of all the
bidders that could have feasibly participated. Finally, favoritism may
be the product of corrupt or unethical behavior, such as accepting
bribes or entertaining job offers from bidders. Although this latter
kind of behavior receives considerable attention from the press (e.g.,
Operation Ill-Wind),5' in our opinion, it is a relatively insignificant
problem.52
A third incentive problem, which we call the "appropriability
problem," arises when a PO is not fully compensated at the margin
for the cost of his or her effort and, in addition, the effort is not
easily monitored. A PO managing a computer procurement does not
have the proper incentives to exert the socially optimal level of effort.
For example, including extra bidders in a procurement means more
work for a PO,but it also means lower expected cost for the govern-

the Competition In Contracting Act, A.B.A. SEc. PUB. CoNT. L. 63 (1989).
49. See Jerome S. Gabig, A Primer on Federal Information Systems Acquisitions, 17
PM. CoNT. L.J. 31, 74 (1987). A GAO report indicated that after Best and Final Offers
[hereinafter "BAFOs"], a "late night meeting" occurred between IBM and INS personnel, and
IBM was allowed to adjust its bid and, consequently, won the award. Id.
50. During the conduct of the procurement, the PO may not discuss future employment
opportunities. Furthermore, there is a two-year bar, after leaving the government, from working on the same contract in which one participated while in the government. See 41 U.S.C. §
401 (1991). See generally Roger G. Darley, New 'Revolving Door' Issues for Federal Officials Under the OFPP Policy Act Amendments of 1988: A Quick Overview, 18 PUB. CONT.
L.L 432 (1989).
51. Influence and information were peddled in the Teledyne case. A consultant was able
to exercise influence to keep an aircraft ID system from being designated as a small business
set aside, and to eliminate a competitor for technical reasons. In addition, information was
obtained on a rival's price. United States v. Sullivan, Nos. 89-5414 & 89-5415, 1991 WL at
*2-3 (4th Cir. May 8, 1990).
52. See William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures and Teaming Arrangements Involving Government Contractors, 58 ANTITrUST L.J. 1059 (1990). Especially of interest is the discussion of attempts to control corruption in procurement. See hi at 1076-77.
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ment. Unfortunately, the cost savings do not redound to the benefit of
the PO, undercutting the incentive to conduct an efficient procurement.5 3 Effort may also be under-provided in tasks such as testing
products, becoming familiar with new vendors, or learning about different technical solutions to an agency's computing problems. In the
private sector, the appropriability problem is counteracted by the
linkage of opportunities for promotion to managerial effort. The ability to create this incentive in the public sector is limited by Civil
Service rules.'
There is yet another incentive problem that is observationally
equivalent to the appropriability problem discussed above, but that
stems from a different source. Managers of agencies are often more
concerned with current year budgets and expenditures than taxpayers
would want them to be. This high discount rate arises because
intertemporal substitution of funds is very constrained in federal agencies. In addition, many agency managers view their current employment as a stepping stone to better opportunities, either within government or in the private sector. Consequently, their planning horizon is
shorter than taxpayers would like. As a result, the procurement offices
in many federal agencies are excessively constrained in terms of resources. Typically, short-handed personnel are asked to complete a
task in a relatively short period of time, where the measure of a job
well done are the costs incurred in running the procurement and the
speed with which the final product is brought through the front
door.55 The result is that diligent POs may respond to these exces-

53.

JAMES

Q.

WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMIENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY

THEY Do IT (1989) (suggesting that effort is hard to measure in government agencies).
54. "The civil service system puts extreme limits on the discretion of managers to hire
and fire employees. The corpus of rules regulating such decisions is embodied in statutes and
in 6000 pages of personnel regulations." STEVEN KELmAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOvERNMENT 180 (1987). Managers do have some flexibility in
making promotion decisions, see id. at 182, but they have trouble controlling the
appropriability problem because it is difficult to fire people. See id. at 184. The problem is
compounded by a lack of performance measures. See id at 187.
55. A high-ranking official at the Department of the Treasury recently made the following statement: "The internal costs of increased staff hours [from efforts to avert protests] may
not be immediately noticeable in the Government's budget, but it does become noticeable
when the attention and energy of the IRM staffs are diverted from implementing quality
systems to merely managing the process." Steven W. Broadbent, Urgent Need for ADP Procurement Reform, GOV'T WORKPLACE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES REP. (Fall 1990) (Broadbent
is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information Services at the Department of the Treasury).
This complaint is symptomatic of an appropriability problem. Specifically, the author is very
concerned about the cost of running the procurement as opposed to the benefits to taxpayers
that are derived from enhanced competition.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 20:1

sive constraints and distortionary incentives by excessively reducing
the number of firms that can participate in a procurement-certainly
five bids can be evaluated at lower cost than ten bids, and certainly
benchmark tests are more cheaply applied when biased toward a
single firm than when objectively applied to all bidders. Too little
effort is exerted by the procuring agency in running the procurement,
not because the POs have opted to shirk, but because dedicated POs
simply are not allocated the resources to do the high quality work
that taxpayers want them to do. The cause of this problem is the
agency problem of the POs' superiors, but it results in the same kind
of appropriability problem discussed in the preceding paragraph. For
simplicity, we lump these two problems together and attribute them to
the PO.
All three of the incentive problems may result in the inappropriate exclusion of bidders by biased or overly restrictive solicitations.
Furthermore, the technology bias and favoritism may be manifest at
any of the other stages of the award process. For example, a scoring
function can be constructed so that an award is made to a firm offering a fast machine of small capacity when a slow machine of larger
capacity would provide the government with greater surplus, or the
benchmark test of how long a laptop's battery will hold a charge can
be conducted in such a way that a favored product passes the test. 6
Compounding the incentive problems is the fact that the quality
of decision making is sometimes deficient. The government has difficulty retaining personnel because salaries are often low compared to
private sector alternatives." In addition, personnel may be rotated
through a particular procurement activity fairly quickly.5 8 A lack of
experience and technical sophistication makes POs dependent on
vendors for assistance in drafting solicitations.59 Naturally, this cre56. Many readers will recognize from personal experience the same agency problems
manifest in the activity of procuring reimbursed air travel. The reader should categorize the
following distortions from efficient decision-making: calling a single airline for fare information; choosing an airline based on the quality of meals or in-flight movies; neglecting advance purchase discounts or selecting first class seating; and choosing an airline to accumulate frequent flier miles.
57. See Key-suk Kim & Mark A. Zupan, The Role of Vendor Past Performance in
Defense Contract Awards: Some Empirical Evidence 10 (Dec. 1990) (unpublished manuscript,
available at the USC School of Business).
58. In the military, "ticket punching," or rotation through certain positions, is required
for advancement. Notions of fairness require inefficiently frequent rotation of officers. See
WILSON, supra note 47. A three-year tour is typical for contracting officers. See Comments
of Bolton, supra note 39.
59. Firms send representatives to information management groups within agencies on a
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ates opportunities for firms to gain an unfair advantage in a procurement. 60
An Illustrative Hypothetical Example
In this section, we pose an example in which six firms can potentially bid to supply a vendor with a commodity. Five of the vendors will bid new products. The PO has no prior beliefs regarding
these five firms or their products that would lead him to be able, ex
ante, to distinguish among them-all produce high quality products.
However, the sixth firm supplies used products that have been reconditioned. A quality index r describes how this firm's product falls on
the continuum between high quality and low quality. Specifically, q6
= r .qH + (1 - r) • qLandq, = qffr i = 1,... , 5. The number
of firms, qHt, qL, and r are all common knowledge amongst the players. Finns will be assessed on the surplus that they offer the procuring agency-the firm that offers the highest difference between gross
value and cost will win.61 The PO will incur a positive bid evaluation cost of Ce for each and every bid that is submitted. The issue
is whether or not it is appropriate for the PO to write a bid solicitation that excludes the sixth firm. To make the issue interesting, we
will assume that both C, and q,, - qL are large enough that exclusion
is appropriate when r = 0, but inclusion is appropriate when r = 1.
We also assume that C, is small enough that inclusion of firms one
through five is always appropriate.
The decision to include or exclude is depicted in Figure 1. The
straight line depicts the net benefits to taxpayers from ex ante inclusion of only the five firms, denoted U(1, . . . ,5). The convex locus
depicts the net benefits from inclusion of all six firms in the procurement, denoted U(1, . . . ,6). The locus is convex since, as r increases,
the other five firms must bid more aggressively to fend off the ever

regular basis. Jeff Stollman, Conference on -Procurement Oversight," Comments at the American Enterprise Institute (July 1990) (Jeff Stollman is the owner of Rocky Mountain Trading
Corp. Systems and specializes in selling microcomputer equipment to the federal government.).
60. A PO will take a spec sheet from a major vendor to create the specifications in an
RFP and unintentionally include irrelevant specifications that are exclusionary. See id.
61. It may seem that the sixth firm should be naturally excluded. However, if each of
the five firms bidding new products is expected to provide a gross value of one million dollars at a cost of eight hundred thousand dollars, while the sixth firm is expected to provide
gross value of five hundred thousand dollars at a cost of one hundred thousand dollars, then
it is clearly advantageous, in terms of surplus maximization, to include the sixth firm.
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increasing threat that firm six will win the procurement. The value of
r where the curves cross, r', is the point at which taxpayers are indifferent between inclusion and exclusion of the sixth firm. At r' the
marginal gains attained from the increased competition resulting from
inclusion of the sixth firm are exactly equal to the marginal costs of
including the sixth firm in the procurement (namely, Ce). For values
of r less than r* the marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefits so
exclusion is appropriate, whereas for values of r greater than r*, the
marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost so inclusion is appropriate.
Figure 1
Optimal Pre-Bid Inclusion and Exclusion

U

U0UI1...

,6)

0

1

r

Key
[0, r*)

Firms 1 through 5 included, firm 6 excluded.

[r*,1l

All firms included.

How does the PO view this world? If he has no agency problem,
then he sees the world exactly as depicted in Figure 1. His bid solicitation will be appropriately restrictive. However, suppose he suffers
from an appropriability problem. We represent the appropriability
problem with a parameter X, which lies in the unit interval where X =
1 represents no appropriability problem and the appropriability worsens as X decreases. This case is depicted in Figure 2. In Figure 2, we
have reproduced the curves from Figure 1. But, in addition, we have

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss1/1

18

Marshall et al.: The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procureme
PROCUREMENT OVERSIGHT BY PROTEST

1991]

added two other curves that reflect the net benefit to a PO who suffers from an appropriability problem from inclusion of five finms62
5 I X < 1) and inclusion of six finms (denoted
(denoted by U(1, ...
byU(1,...,61X< 1).
Figure 2
Pre-Bid Inclusion and Exclusion With and
Without an Appropriability Problem

U

U(1...,6 )
u(1.....)

__

__)__

~u(l,.....6jXxcl)
u(1.....51X'<1)

0

__

_____

r*

r**

1

r

Key

[r*,r**)

Firms I through 5 included, f'mn6 appropriately
excluded.
Taxpayers want all firms included, PO excludes firm 6.

[r**, 1]

All six firms appropriately included.

[0, r*)

Two points about Figure 2 deserve mention. First, the curves that
represent the PO's net benefit when he suffers from an appropriability
problem lie below the corresponding curves for the government (or
the case where the PO has no appropriability problem). This is intuitively sensible. With an appropriability problem, the PO incurs all
the costs of running the procurement (e.g., evaluating bids), but receives only a small percentage of the gross benefits from so doing.
Therefore, net benefits are smaller for the PO than they are for the
government. Second, the curves reflecting the PO's appropriability

62. We suppose here that, despite the appropriability problem, the PO will continue to
include the first five firms. If the problem is severe enough, however, some of those will
also be excluded.
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problem cross at r*, which is greater than r*.63 The intuition is
straightforward. Consider the indifference point r*. As the
appropriability problem begins to take hold, the PO still incurs the
full cost of product evaluation, but does not get the full gross benefits
from the inclusion decision. Therefore, the PO will no longer be
indifferent as between inclusion and exclusion of the sixth firm at
r*-he or she will prefer exclusion. For the PO to be indifferent as
between inclusion and exclusion r must rise to r**.
The punch-line of these simple analytics is straightforward-as
the appropriability problem grows, the bid solicitation becomes excessively restrictive. If the sixth firm falls between r* and r**, then taxpayers will want the firm included (i.e., inclusion maximizes surplus),
but the PO with the appropriability problem (X < 1) will exclude the
firm.
C.

The Benefits and Costs of Protest Oversight

The pros and cons of a protest process depend to a great extent
on its governing rules. Does the protester have access to the standard
means of discovery? Is the standard of review arbitrary and capricious
or de novo? Do the judges simply offer recommendations or do they
render decisions that have bite? The GSBCA protest process is characterized by rigorous discovery and extensive remedial powers."
Protests concerning non-computer contract awards are entertained at
other forums that adopt circumspect review standards,6 and have
limited remedial power6 or limited discovery. 67 In the ensuing
parts of this section, we will analyze protest oversight in general.
When necessary, we will explicitly identify arguments that are contingent on, say, the corrective measures available to the judges or
hearing officers.
1. The Benefits of Protest Oversight
The theoretical basis of decentralizing oversight has been considered in other settings 6 under the rubric of enforcement by private

63.
64.
65.
viewing
66.
67.
limited.
68.

This result can be demonstrated analytically. See Marshall et al., supra note 28.
See infra Section H.C. and accompanying notes.
The Federal District and Claims Courts use an arbitrary or capricious standard in reagency contract awards. See infra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
See Infra note 158 and accompanying text.
Outside of computer and telecommunication procurement GAO discovery is quite
See Infra note 157 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (holding that, because the
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attorneys general.69 Protesters may be characterized as private attorneys general because they have incentives to detect and prosecute
actions by procurement officials that are contrary to the public interest. The private nature of this enforcement activity gives it advantages
and disadvantages quite different from typical centralized enforcement
activity.
As we argued in Section I.B., oversight is necessary because
procurement officials have incentives to manage the award process in
a manner that may conflict with taxpayers' interests. When products
like staple food items are being procured, simply requiring competitive bidding is effective in combatting incentive problems. The procurement official has little discretion, and an attempt to award a contract to a firm other than the lowest bidder would be easily detected.
In the case of heterogenous commodities, such as computer systems, evaluating bids only on a cost basis is no solution. Simply put,
lowest cost does not necessarily imply highest surplus in such cases.
It is a difficult task to verify that an awardee offers the best combination of price and quality or that the technology described in the
specifications is appropriate-hence the need for more sophisticated
oversight.
The threat of protest has valuable regulatory effects: it both
deters and corrects inappropriate awards that are contrary to the objective of surplus maximization. Take, for example, a PO who suffers
from a technology bias. Without the protest process, this PO may
inappropriately exclude low-tech firms (that can potentially offer low
cost and high surplus) from the procurement or bias the scoring function to favor a high-tech firm. The costs and penalties inflicted upon
POs and their procuring agencies, given a successful protest, will
deter POs, at the margin, from acting on their technology bias. Society benefits from the corrective impact of protests when POs, who
would otherwise be undeterred, are forced to alter inappropriate procurement practices."
settlement of a patent validity dispute has implications for the public, normal rules favoring
settlement may not always apply); E.T. SULUVAN ET AL, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCEDURE 77 (1989).
69. See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrol vs. Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165 (1984); A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980); David
Friedman, Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 379
(1984); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357 (1984); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 713 (1988).
70. The seminal economics work on deterrence is Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punish-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 20:1

Besides its deterrent and corrective powers, the protest process
also reduces the incentives for firms to exercise inappropriate influence over procurement personnel. Federal computer firms are in constant contact with agency officials in order to influence the specifications contained in upcoming procurements. These marketing activities
are generally licit and helpful, but sometimes extend to implicit promises of future employment or even bribery. 71 A firm that is successful in gaining influence has the procurement proposal written in such
a way as to exclude potential competitors or raise their cost of supplying the government. This has the two effects of raising the probability that the influence-wielding firm will win the contract and, in
addition, increasing the expected price. Allowing competitors to protest the terms of a proposal offers a check against illicit influence.
The protest mechanism reduces the rents from influence activities
in two ways. First, a successful protest deprives the influence-using
firm of a contract and forces it to pay protest costs. Second, a settlement forces the winner to share part of the profit from improper
influence. The reduction in expected rents causes the investment in
influence to fall; therefore, the probability of an inefficient award
falls. Society also garners the direct benefit of reduced investment in
wasteful rent-seeking activities.
A final benefit of the protest process is its ability to produce
product information that is beneficial to the PO. In addition to disciplining POs who suffer from distorted incentives, protests allow an
appropriately excluded firm to gain entry into a procurement when
this would be desirable. In a world without agency problems or protests, certain firms or products are appropriately excluded from a
procurement because they are unlikely to be a good match with government needs.7 In the case in which a firm offering a good match
has been excluded, it can avail itself of the protest process to reverse
its exclusion.
Suppose, for example, that a hardware procurement is restricted
to new products because the PO has a prior belief that used products
are generally unreliable. 73 A vendor offering used equipment that
was acceptable for a particular application has the protest process as a

ment; An Economic Approach, 6 J. POL ECON. 169 (1968).
71. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 71 (stressing the helpful nature of such communication).
72. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of optimal exclusion.
73. See, e.g., Computer Mldg. Corp., GSBCA No. 8131-P-H, 86-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
18,592 (1985).
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means of credibly demonstrating that its product is acceptable. Protests can be more efficient than testing since protests occur only when
a firm knows that its product is. acceptable, while testing would be
used all of the time by the less informed PO.
74
2. The Costs of Protest Oversight
There are several potential limitations and drawbacks to oversight
by protest, such as imperfect deterrence, inappropriate settlements,
inappropriate inclusions and awards, and poor decisions by POs that
were not in the interest of potential protesters to flag.75 Of course,
procurement oversight of any kind is bound to be costly. 76 The costs
are naturally lower for weaker protest forums (e.g., no discovery,
arbitrary and capricious review standard, no enforcement powers), but
so are the benefits. We discuss methods of alleviating these costs in
the context of the GSBCA in Section I.E.1.

Imperfect Deterrence
An unsurprising friction in the protest process is that deterrence
is imperfect. As a result, resources are consumed in hearing protests
and correcting decisions by POs. It is often difficult for potential
protesters to know whether the PO has made a specific award decision because of an agency problem or because the awardee's product
is truly superior to the protester's product. The uncertainty of success
for a protester, along with the substantial costs associated with an

74. Much of the discussion in this section is based upon the results in Robert C.
Marshall et al., Curbing Agency Problems in the Procurement Process by Protest Oversight,
(1990) (Duke University mimeo).
75. Below, we discuss in detail what we perceive to be the most serious shortcomings
of the current protest process. We take a moment here to mention two other complaints that
have been voiced. First is the possibility that firms will use the protest process to raise their
rivals' costs. Kovacie notes this problem and suggests that there is possible antitrust control
of protest harassment of a competitor. See William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Government Contracts Handbook 49-50 (Oct 10, 1989) (unpublished). Second, protests allegedly have a
chilling effect on communications between a PO and the industry, making it difficult for the
government to learn which ADPTE best suits its needs. See Bolton, supra note 39; see also
Bert Rosecan, President of SMS Date Products, Comments at the Conference on "Procurement
Oversight" at the AEI (July 1990).
76. Even in the private sector, ADPTE procurement is quite contentious. See Gabig,
supra note 49, at 32 (stating that one out of ten transactions involving ADP products or services results in a lawsuit) (citing B. BRIcxmAN, LEGAL ASPEcTS: ACQUIRING AND PROTECTING SOFrWARE 9 (1984)). This fraction is comparable to the rate of protests in federal
computer procurements.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REPVIEW

[Vol. 20:1

unsuccessful protest, will inhibit firms from protesting every questionable exclusion or award decision." POs recognize this fact and take
advantage of it by making exclusion and award decisions that are
inconsistent with surplus maximization. They are willing to risk an
adverse protest judgment because there is a significant probability that
their inappropriate action will not be detected. 78
Settlements
The second shortcoming of the protest process concerns settlements. Settlement can be divided into two categories-"inappropriate"
and "appropriate." A settlement is appropriate when it is consistent
with the objective of maximizing surplus for taxpayers. Otherwise, a
settlement is inappropriate. Two kinds of appropriate settlements occur
when (1) an excessively exclusionary bid solicitation is rewritten to
include potential bidders1 9 or (2) product evaluations that were biased are re-conducted in an unbiased manner. In either (1) or (2), it
might be the case that the procuring agency voluntarily pays cash to
a protester of an amount not in excess of the costs incurred by the
protester in bringing the deficiencies of the procurement to its attention. This kind of cash settlement is not inappropriate. Since almost
all other cash settlements are inappropriate," whether they are paid
by the procuring agency or a firm, we will use the term "cash settlement" to denote an inappropriate cash settlement. If a firm pays a
cash settlement, it is typically one that has been named as awardee
by the procuring agency pending the outcome of the protest, although
it is possible that a firm that is highly favored by an excessively
restrictive request for proposals (hereinafter "RFP") could settle in
cash with a pre-award protester. An in-kind settlement involves a
sharing of the award, via a subcontract, between the named awardee

77. A finn that is likely to deal repeatedly with a PO or agency is also inhibited from
protests because of a concern that it will be treated badly in future procurements. However,
the reputation issue cuts both ways. A PO may be more solicitous of a finn that has a
reputation as a protester, heightening the deterrent effect of protests.
78. See Marshall et al., supra note 74.
79. See, e.g., Government Sys. Integration Corp., GSBCA No. 8685-P B.C.A. (CCH)
(1986).
80. They lead to the continuation of an overly restrictive procurement or an award that
is inconsistent with surplus maximization. The analysis of bribery and public versus private
enforcement covers similar ground. See generally Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law
Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974);
Landes & Posner, supra note 10; Friedman, supra note 69.
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and the protester in exchange for withdrawal of the protest. All inkind settlements are inappropriate."
Inappropriate settlements subvert the private attorney general role
of the protester.8" When the protest process allows for discovery,
many protests are withdrawn after discovery due either to lack of
cause or to settlement. This is normal in any type of dispute; the vast
majority of conflicts in our legal system are settled rather than litigated. One difficulty in operating the protest process is the conflict between encouraging good faith settlements that conserve judicial resources and preventing or deterring inappropriate settlements.
To understand an inappropriate settlement, consider the case of a
protester who has been inappropriately excluded from a procurement
because the PO suffers from an appropriability problem. The protester
accepts a cash settlement from the procuring agency. This compensates the protester for its foregone expected profits, net of protest
costs, from participation in the procurement were it run properly.
However, all remaining firms in the procurement will bid less aggressively than if the protesting firm were included. This is a natural byproduct of diminished competition. The diminished competition results
in lower expected surplus from the procurement for the government.
In agreeing to the settlement, the protesting firm does not consider
the costs imposed on taxpayers from a procurement that will be conducted with diminished competition and, in addition, the PO is concerned only with some fraction of this cost. In other words, cash or
in-kind settlements may produce a negative externality for taxpayers
that defeat the private attorney general role of protesters-despite
being alerted to the fact that the procurement is not consistent with
surplus maximization, the outcome is (1) no increase in the number
of firms participating in the procurement and (2) the payment of a
transfer (by the PO and, consequently, by taxpayers) so that an excessively restrictive procurement can continue.
Unfortunately, if the PO's agency problem is severe, the threat
of protest does not deter bad decisions but, instead, induces the PO
(or awardee) to offer a cash or in-kind settlement to protesters.83 We

81. This does not mean that all subcontracts are inappropriate. There are often efficiency
justifications for subcontracts.
82. The private attorney general function of protesters was noted by the Board in
22,377 (1989)
Bedford Computer Corp. GSBCA No. 9837-C (9742-P) B.C.A. (CCH)
(stating that a fedmail payment is possible).
83. Kelman describes a case that may be interpreted as a buy-off settlement organized
by the awardee by means of a subcontract. In a procurement with two bidders, IBM won the
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refer to such settlement as "buy-off' settlements." If the necessary
"buy-off' payment to gain settlement would be too large, then the PO
might still insist on an inappropriate exclusion and refuse to entertain
settlement discussions. In such a case, the PO tries to "bluff' the
excluded firm into believing that its exclusion is justified.
The fact that the PO and the procuring agency face costs associated with successfully defending themselves against a protest leads to
two potentially undesirable outcomes. The first is another variety of
inappropriate settlement. It arises when POs make appropriate decisions that are challenged by protesters. In such cases, they face a
choice-settle with the protester or incur the costs associated with a
successful defense. Often times the POs (or awardees) will opt for a
cash settlement. In fact, the press has devoted much attention to these
kinds of protests, referring to them as "fedmail." 85 Supposedly, a
subset of the new entrants to the federal computers market are engaged, to an extent, in this activity.86

Overdeterrence
Besides fedmail, the costs incurred by a PO as a result of a
successful protest defense may lead to "overdeterrence."
Overdeterrence occurs when a PO who would make an appropriate
decision in the absence of protests makes an inappropriate decision in
order to minimize expected protest costs. The problem is manifest in
the over-inclusion of bidders in the procurement 7 and in bad award

award. EDS protested and the procuring agency, INS, settled the post-award protest by changing the award to EDS, which subcontracted with IBM. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 140;
see also Infra text accompanying notes 209-13.
84. See, e.g., Systemhouse Fed. Sys., Inc., GSBCA No. 9936-P, 89-2 B.C.A. (CCH)

21,743 (1989) (in which the Navy and a protester reached a settlement in which the parties
stated that they disagreed on the interpretation of the evaluation criteria and the Navy paid
the protester $190,000 for its expenses).
85. A recent GAO report, ADP Bid Protests, GAO/GGD-90-13 (March 1990), investigates fedmail in light of a cash settlement paid by the Bureau of the Census to three
protesters for $1.1 million dollars. The GAO does not find fedmail to be a substantial
problem. See Id. at 4.
86. Although fedmail is not common, see d., our perspective on the protest mechanism
as a substitute for auditing rationalizes its practices. Finns that are on the periphery of
procurement award contests-that profit from frequent protests and rarely win procurement
awards-play a socially useful role as -auditors," by deterring inappropriate procurement
decisions.
87. A marginal bidder wants to get out of a procurement and learn that he has no
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decisions. In the latter case, overdeterrence hinges on a difference
between bidders in their propensity to protest. For example, an incumbent may be less likely to protest because it assumes that the PO
is likely to be biased in its favor. Perversely, the PO may deny an
incumbent an entitled award in order to avoid incurring protest costs
from more litigious non-incumbent bidders. 8
Taxpayers Can Be Harmed When Potential ProtestersAre Not.
A final difficulty with the protest process is that certain inappropriate procurement decisions are harmful to taxpayers but not harmful
enough to any firm to generate a protest. For example, the over-inclusion phenomenon that we attribute to overdeterrence does not generate
protests because of free-riding. A properly included firm that might
protest would gain little from the exclusion of one rival and would
rather wait for some other firm to protest. The result may be no
protest at all. As a second example, recall that the purpose of a reserve in a competitive procurement is to induce aggressive bidding
and lower acquisition costs. But a reserve also creates a possibility
that no award will be made under the current solicitation. POs suffering from a technology bias might decline to set a reserve because
they are less concerned about cost than about the prospect of procuring a high-tech product. In such circumstances the bidders are apt to
support the POs decision unanimously. The only party that suffers is
the government.
3. An Example
We now return to the hypothetical example of section I.B. to
illustrate the deterrent power of protests as well as buy-off settlements. Within the context of this example, consider the creation of a
protest forum. The judges or hearing officers of the protest forum can

chance, but CICA encourages POs to leave firms in the competitive range to avoid protest.
See Gabig & Bean, supra note 24, at 570 (stating that the GAO will "scrupulously review
an agency's decision to leave a single offeror in the competitive range because such an
action is repugnant to the statutory preference for competition.").
88. Related to the notion of overdeterrence is the possibility that POs eliminate subjective (but useful) data from evaluation criteria or that they are too permissive in establishing
specifications and making inclusion decisions. These practices could result from fear of
protest. For example, government buyers often have previous experience with a vendor, but
cannot use this information as an evaluation criterion. A survey of government computer
managers revealed that 59% of them find vendor selected references at other sites to provide
information that is either not candid or not useful. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 48.
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order the procuring agency to include an inappropriately excluded
firm. If the sixth firm protests, the PO will incur a cost, u (meant to
represent procurement delays, legal expenses, etc.). In this simple
model, n > 0 ensures that the PO will either include the sixth firm or
settle-no protests will actually occur.5 9 The sixth firm will accept a
settlement payment from the PO of z and agree to drop its protest.
None of the other firms have any conceivable grounds for protest-they will all be included and treated symmetrically since they
are ex ante homogeneous. This example is depicted in Figure 3. We
assume that
O*(1,... 5 r' X < 1) -U*(1,...
6
X*,
< 1) > z
At the point r, the above inequality is an equality.
Figure 3
Settlement and Deterrence Induced by the Threat of Protest
For a PO with an Appropriability Problem

U
U(1.....6)

z{

r*

0

r

r**

1

r

Key
[0, r*)

1 through 5 included.
No protests, only firms

[r*, r,)

Buyoff settlement of amount z paid to firm 6,
only firms
1 through 5 included.

[rz, r**)

Deterrence, all six firms included where only firns
Ithrough 5 would be included without protests.

[r**, 1]

All six finms included even without protests.

89. All the players in this game know r, alu,q, and how bids will be evaluated, and
they all know that they know, etc. Also, we assume that the protest forum is free of potential mistakes. Simply put, there is no source of uncertainty in this model. Consequently, no

litigation will be observed in equilibrium.
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What behavior would be observed in the context of this model
and why? For values of r below r* and above r- the PO and the
judges of the protest forum are in complete agreement-above r", all
six firms should be included and below r, the sixth firm should be
excluded. Between r* and r**, the PO wants to exclude the sixth firm,
but taxpayers want inclusion. The judges' criterion is identical to that
of the taxpayers. Consequently, between r" and r., the PO will offer a
buy-off settlement of z to the sixth firm in order not to incur a protest. The payment of z is acceptable to the sixth firm and making
such a payment leaves the PO better off-the net loss to the PO from
including the sixth firm for values of r between r* and r, exceeds the
cost of settlement, z. However, between r, and r** this is no longer
true. The PO finds that the settlement payment exceeds the net loss
derived from exclusion. Realizing that the sixth firm will protest and
prevail, the PO is deterred from the inappropriate exclusion and,
instead, includes the sixth firm between r, and r**. °
D. Protests versus Audits
In this section, we contrast protest oversight with the standard
and more centralized approach to oversight. We imprecisely refer to
centralized oversight as auditing. This label is intended to encompass
review of procurements by the General Accounting Office (hereinafter
"GAO") or Congressional staff, coupled with sanctions like bad publicity, funding cuts by Congressional oversight committees or sanctions by the Executive branch.
Despite uncovering occasional sensational procurement blunders
in the realm of federal procurement, audits, as currently implemented,
do not systematically constrain the discretion of POs. A major factor
is the limited enforcement power available to auditors. 9' POs cannot
be deterred from abuse of discretion if sanctions are insubstantial and

90. In other work, we have posed models that explain fedmail, overdeterrence and
bluffing as well. Unfortunately, these models are far more complicated and, therefore, inappropriate for presentation here. See Marshall et al., supra note 74.
91. Congress has the ability to monitor agency procurement decisions closely and to
punish violators. Appropriation and re-authorization bills provide an opportunity to reward or
punish an agency. See McCubbins et al., supra note 34, at 244; see also WILSON, supra note
53 (stating that annual authorization for expenditure is required in addition to appropriation).
The powers are rarely used because of information problems faced by Congress and the
conflicting incentives generated by pork barrel politics. See generally WILSON, supra note 47.
Consequently, oversight schemes that rely on the activities of a Congressional committee are
plagued by problems in establishing credible enforcement threats. See generally McCubbins et
al., supra note 34.
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improbable.92 The fact of procurement blunders and scandals is itself
evidence that deterrence is failing. By contrast, the GSBCA93 has
substantial enforcement powers.'
Even if audits were supported by sanctions comparable to protests, audits have less deterrent power because auditors are not profit
motivated and are likely to be at an informational disadvantage as
compared to protesters because they come to a procurement as outsiders. The informational advantages of protests mean that violations of
procurement law are detected more effectively, and the profit incentive of the protesters assures more vigorous prosection of violators.
Although audits are less potent in deterring inappropriate behavior by POs, they avoid many of the pitfalls of protests. The problem
of buy-off and fedmail settlements is obviously eliminated. In addition, the problem of overdeterrence is less likely under audits for two
reasons. First, the cost of an audit to a compliant PO is apt to be
small. Second, the imprecision of audits in selecting cases for review
undermines the logic that leads to the overdeterrence strategy. In
other words, a PO does not have the assurance that specific decisions
are safe from audit. Finally, there are circumstances in which no
bidder will have a profit incentive to protest. In contrast, audits can
correct problems such as the absence of a reserve or the over-inclusion of firms.
A different, but faulty, perspective for comparison of audits and
protests is based on the observation that protests, by their very nature,
are a way of regulating the input phase of the procurement process
rather than the output phase. Audits can evaluate both phases and,
thus, may be superior. In the private sector, if products are purchased

92. Ironically, ADPTE procurement has seen some effective monitoring by Congress. We
believe that the circumstances producing these results are unique and do not make a sufficient case for sanctions implemented by Congress directly. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 141
(noting that, after criticism from the GAO, Congress cut appropriations and the INS redid a
computer procurement in which the agency had settled post-award by switching the award to
the protester who subcontracted with the original awardee); see also Gabig, supra note 49, at
37 (stating that the House Government Operations Committee has gotten 30 acquisitions
suspended at its request over a four year period, even though it has no statutory authority,
due, in large part, to the activities of Congressman Jack Brooks of Texas).
93. The GSBCA has been successfully insulated from the distributive politics that plague
Congressional oversight. See Gabig, supra note 49, at 42-43 (stating that the GSBCA has
broad jurisdiction and a strengthened Congressional mandate in dealing with other federal
agencies. It has the authority to determine whether a procurement is subject to its jurisdiction.
The Office of Management and Budget (hereinafter "OMB") cannot override GSBCA decisions concerning its jurisdiction).
94. See infra Section II.C. and accompanying notes.
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that lead to diminished profitability relative to an alternative, then,
regardless of the procedures used, the procurement will be deemed a
failure. By analogy, it could be argued that we need to find some
output-based measure like profits to assess procurement performance
in the public sector, and that we should not be concerned about input-based evaluation. This argument suffers from a number of limitations. First, if a PO in the private sector was found to favor unjustly
a particular vendor in a procurement, then, regardless of the ultimate
profitability of the procured items, this PO would face serious penalties from his employer. Second, how does one measure output in a
public sector procurement? In the private sector, if American Airlines
buys a new computer system for handling bookings and reservations,
it is likely to increase profits. Nevertheless, the procurement personnel
who handled the acquisition might be fired since their counterparts at
United Airlines bought a system for similar expense that was significantly more profitable. Since the federal government is largely engaged in the monopolistic production of public goods, there do not
exist good comparative ways to assess the output performance of
commodities procured by agencies. In addition, any attempts to measure output performance in a non-comparative way is likely to be
subject to manipulation and misrepresentation by the procuring agency. Third, in the private sector, compensation for procurement personnel can easily be tied to the profitability of procurements-Civil
Service rules are far less flexible in terms of accommodating contingent rewards for employees.
Our comparison of protests and audits suggests that protests are
a more powerful oversight mechanism, but that they have more adverse side effects. Audits are apt to result in the review of more
properly conducted procurements. But protests result in fedmail, buyoffs and overdeterrence.
It is also important to observe that the stylized descriptions of
protests and audits do not capture possible hybrid oversight mechanisms.95 We argue in section II.E.1. that supervision of protest settle-

95. Qui tam suits and antitrust litigation are decentralized, share many of the advantages
of protests and can be applied to cases of illegal conduct. A conspiracy between a winning
bidder and a government entity or employee violates the antitrust laws, while a party aware
of improprieties in a procurement generating false claims against the government may initiate
a qui tam suit. See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1053 (1986); F. Buddie Contracting Inc. v. Seawright, 595
F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable Ltd., 547 F.
Supp. 633 (D. Alaska 1982). Attempts to influence POs to buy certain products may be anti-
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ment reduces the harm from buy-offs and fedmail. Similarly, the poor
selection of cases by audit could be improved by making the auditor
responsive to complaints by bidders.9 Finally, it may be appropriate
to use audits and protest simultaneously. The auditor could minimize
the side effects from the protest process by reversing inappropriate
settlements, over-inclusion and the lack of use of a reserve.
H. THE PROTEST EXPERIENCE IN THE FEDERAL COMPUTER MARKET

A. Introduction
In 1984 the Competition in Contracting Act (hereinafter
"CICA")97 was passed. It provided aggrieved firms in federal

trust violations. See, e.g., Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981); George Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). A violation of a federal or state
antitrust law creates grounds for debarment. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a)(2) (1988). Protests
may have limited success in correcting and punishing corruption, see supra text accompanying
notes 51-52, since award and exclusion decisions that are motivated by corruption are likely
to result in a protest. However, the use of whistleblowers is likely to be more effective
because employees of the offending firms will have better information than a firm's competitors. Reports to the Inspector General or the Justice Department by consultants or employees
of the firm making an unethical offer seem to be the most effective means to correct this
type of procurement problem and to punish those involved. See Kovacic, supra note 75, at 78. Companies implicated in Operation Ill Wind must submit a Competitive Information
Certificate to the DOD before the award of new contracts over $100,000. They must promise
not to discuss prices with competitors. Bribery is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. section 201(b) and
procurement fraud by 18 U.S.C. section 1031. The government has tried to create incentives
for individuals to act as whistleblowers by providing financial incentives for them to file qui
rain suits via the False Claims Act of 1986. See United States ex. rel Butenkoff v. Industrial
Tectonics, Inc., 52 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 8 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (a qui ram plaintiff received
$1,427,900 when the government settled a claim with a defense subcontractor who had overcharged the government). The amount is 10% of the government's settlement with the firm.
See Kovacic, supra note 75, at 14. Qui ram actions arise under the False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C. § 3729. The government can intervene and assume responsibility for prosecuting the
action, in which case the citizen gets 15-25% of all funds recovered. If there is no intervention, the citizen gets 25-30% of the funds recovered. See id, at 14.
96. The auditor cannot rely on reports by losing or excluded bidders without some
mechanism in place to deter frivolous complaints. One possibility is to have firms post bonds
with the auditor when they want an investigation. If the auditor finds that the procurement
has been conducted in a manner consistent with surplus maximization, then the bonds would
be forfeited to the government. Otherwise, the procurement would be revised in light of the
problems discovered by the auditor, and the bond would be returned to the firm that posted
it. Such a scheme has three clear advantages. First, it exploits the inside information possessed by firms that are involved with a procurement. Second, it eliminates the possibility of
fedmail since, presumably, the auditor will not accept cash payments to suspend an investigation. Third, it eliminates the possibility of buy-off settlements by the procuring agency or

named awardee.
97. 41 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
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procurements of automated data processing and telecommunication
equipment (hereinafter "ADPTE") the right to protest decisions of the
procuring agency to the General Services Administration Board of
Contract Appeals (hereinafter "GSBCA"). 98 The protest process at
the GSBCA has had a significant impact on ADPTE procurements
over the past eight years. The Request for Proposals (hereinafter
"RFPs") and Invitation for Bids (hereinafter "IFBs") that are issued
now for federal ADPTE procurements are far less restrictive than they
were eight years ago, permitting larger numbers of firms to participate.99 Questionable practices of POs, such as favoring particular
vendors or biasing product evaluation towards excessively high technology items, have been both deterred and corrected by the GSBCA
protest process." ° In addition, GSBCA protests have provided the
makers of new or unique products, whose exclusion from federal
ADPTE procurements was often a fait accompli, a means to gain
access into the federal ADPTE market. 0 1
In Part II of this Article, we provide evidence that decentralized
oversight has been successful in the case of federal computer procurement. In sections lI.B., II.C. and II.D., we discuss the relevant procurement and protest law and the actual impact of protests. In section
II.E., we evaluate four issues in protest law and make recommendations informed by the theoretical analysis in Part I. The issues concern alleviation of protest costs, bidder collusion, standing to protest
and the role of intervenors in the protest process. The role of protest
cost allocation is shown to be significant in minimizing the problems
of overdeterrence and fedmail, and in achieving an optimal level of
deterrence. Furthermore, the regulation of protest settlements is analyzed as a tool for decreasing buy-offs. We analyze the GSBCA
protest process as a mechanism for facilitating bidder collusion and
argue that it might provide a means for punishing deviant behavior
within a bidder coalition or a legal means to make cash side-payments within a cartel. A second issue is the recent decision by the

98. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2713, 98 Stat. 494,
1182-84 (1984).
99. Sandra Sugawara & Elizabeth Tucker, Companies' Contract Appeals Clog Government Purchasing, WASH. PosT, Jul. 16, 1988, at AI0 (stating that "[protests] allowl' small
businesses to compete on equal ground [with large ones].").
100. Bruce Adkins & Jack Daley, Strategies for Business Development in the Federal
Marketplace, 31 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROF. COMM. 57 (1988). "mhe process of getting
business and remaining an incumbent is getting more difficult." Id. at 59.
101. See Sugawara & Tucker, supra note 99.
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Federal Circuit to restrict standing in certain GSBCA protests to only
second-ranked firms."° We find that this ruling is not sensible outside of a very restrictive setting that is unlikely to hold in practice.
Furthermore, the negative aspects of this ruling are wide ranging and
potentially severe. For example, it encourages a particular kind of
bidder collusion that could effectively defeat protests as a mechanism
of procurement oversight. Lastly, we find that allowing multiple protesters plays a positive role in facilitating procurement oversight by
inhibiting cash and in-kind settlement. The presence of intervenors in
a protest is more likely to result in settlements that involve corrections in the procurement. In section II.F., we address the concern that
protests stifle the legitimate use of good business judgment by POs.
B.

Procurement Law

Guiding an ADPTE procurement from its inception to contract
award is a daunting task for federal contracting offers. The procurement process is hedged in by a dense thicket of statutes and regulations. °3 To impress upon the reader the complexity of ADPTE procurement law, we provide a brief guide to its main features."°4
Basic federal procurement law has its genesis in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947105 and the Federal Property and Administration Services Act (hereinafter "FPASA"). 1 6 These statutes
authorize the various methods used to procure ADPTE. All
procurements must also comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (hereinafter "FAR")10 7 and relevant ancillary regulations such
as the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (hereinafter "DFARS").
Besides these general procurement provisions, federal computer
procurement is governed by a variety of special statutes and regula-

102. See United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 892 F.2d 1006 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
103. The government has recognized the difficulty of computer procurement and has
embraced a Wild West metaphor by establishing the Trial Boss program to train ADPTE
procurement specialties. Kelman, supra note 1, at 91.
104. For a more thorough treatment of this subject, see RALPH C. NASH & JOHN
CIBINIC, FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1986).
105.

10 U.S.C. § 2301 (1988).

106. 41 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
107. The FAR covers all phases of procurement. For our purposes we are particularly
interested in its rules governing competitive negotiations, the primary method of procuring
ADPTE. For a description of competitive negotiations see infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
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tions. The Brooks Act, enacted in 1965 as an amendment to the
FPASA, was passed to assure the "economic and efficient" procurement of ADPTE by federal agencies.' 8 All computer supplies and
services, as well as telecommunications equipment, fall into the
ADPTE category.1' 9 Under the Brooks Act, the General Services
Administration (hereinafter "GSA") has sole authority to procure
ADPTE for government agencies." ° The GSA may procure the
ADPTE directly or grant the authority back to the individual agencies
at its discretion."'
The Brooks Act has undergone several adjustments in its twentyfive year history, the most important of which involved the ability for
certain agencies to exempt themselves from the ADPTE purchasing
requirements. The Warner Amendment, passed in 1981, exempted
certain Defense Department purchases from the Brooks Act provisions.1 2 Only DOD procurements "critical to the direct fulfillment
of military or intelligence missions" of the United States, or in which
the ADPTE exists 3as "an integral part of a weapon or weapons sys1
tem," are exempt. 1
In addition to the Brooks Act, ADPTE procurements are subject
to the Federal Information Resources Management Regulations
(hereinafter "FIRMR"). "The FIRMR system is established to publish
and codify uniform policies and procedures pertaining to information
resources activities by Federal or executive agencies (as applicable),
and by Government contractors as directed by agencies."'" 4 Yet, because large segments of ADPTE procurements are not specifically
addressed by the FIRMR, the general FAR system and its supplements still exist as the primary body of regulations covering ADPTE

108. Pub. L. No. 89-306, 79 Stat. 1127 (1965) (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 759(a) (1982)).
The Brooks Act was created mainly because different agencies had been purchasing noncompatible equipment, and the government wanted to ensure compatibility and lower costs for
the increased business of buying expensive ADPTE. See PETER S. LATHAM, GOVERNMENT
CONTRACT DISPUTES 3 (2d ed. 1986).
109. See Gabig, supra note 49, at 34.
110. The GSA was also given power to provide the government with adequate management information, to achieve optimal utilization through shared use of equipment, and to gain
economic advantages through volume purchasing of the expensive computer machinery and
software. See LATHAM, supra note 108, at 20-22.
111. Id.at 3.
112. See, e.g.,
10 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988).
113. See id.§ 2315(a). In 1986, the exclusions granted to the DOD via the Warner
Amendment were also interpreted to prevent GSBCA bid protest jurisdiction over those
exempted activities. See 40 U.S.C. § 759(a)(2)(A)-(3)(D) (1988).
114. 41 C.F.R. § 201-1.101(b) (1991).
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procurement.
A recent statutory addition to procurement law is the Competition in Contracting Act. Following scandals in defense procurement
uncovered in Congressional hearings," 5 CICA was introduced to encourage "full and open competition" in federal procurement.
In the case of ADPTE procurement, CICA created a protest
forum at the GSBCA that has effectively guaranteed the promise of
open competition."" CICA gave the GSBCA jurisdiction to hear
and decide protests involving procurements attained under the Brooks
Act, 40 U.S.C. section 759(h).1 7 As indicated by the legislative
history, Congress recognized that CICA's grant of bid protest jurisdiction to the GSBCA "provide[s] a unique and innovative method of
handling protests of a highly technical and complex nature.""' Congress also believed that "the Board is well equipped to provide timely
resolution of conflicts between the procuring agency and the supplier
of computer products and services."" 9
To implement a particular ADPTE procurement, an agency must
secure funds from Congress and permission from the GSA. That permission is granted as a delegated procurement authority, and is referred to as a DPA. Next, the procuring agency identifies its demand
for computational or telecommunication services and chooses a procurement method. Two methods about which we have relatively little
to say in this Article are purchases from the GSA schedule and sole
source procurement. For small and routine procurements, an agency
can order ADPTE from a vendor at a price listed in a schedule maintained by the GSA. 20 At the other extreme, certain highly special-

115. In the House Hearings on the Competition Act of 1984, Representative Horton
questioned a DOD official about a $13 allen wrench for which DOD was billed $9,606.
116. See infra Section II.D. and accompanying notes.
117. This grant of authority was a three-year test program due to expire in 1988, but the
GSBCA's authority over these protests has now been permanently granted. See Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500 § 831, 100 Stat. 1783-335 (1986).
118. H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1431, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1445, 2119.
119. Id.
120.
GSA schedule prices characteristically are lower than the vendor's published commercial catalogue prices. In fact, private sector customers frequently use GSA
schedule prices as a desired target price when negotiating with the respective vendor. In recent years, the GSA has become increasingly aggressive about obtaining
'most favored customer' prices from vendors.
Gabig, supra note 49, at 48. It is appropriate for an agency to place multiple orders on the
schedule to evade the maximum order limitation and CICA requirements. See id. at 49.
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ized and often expensive ADPTE items are procured in sole source
negotiations because of the availability of only a single potential
supplier."' The decision to implement sole source procurement or
to buy from the GSA schedule can be protested," but most protests involve the implementation of a procurement rather than the
choice of method. Thus, for our purposes, in studying the protest of
award decisions, we are most concerned with competitive procurement
conducted as Invitations for Bids or Requests for Proposals.'2
An IFB (also known as sealed bidding or advertising) begins
with an announcement of mandatory specifications that must be satisfied by the ADPTE offered in a bid. Bidders must restate each specification and explain how the proposed equipment and services meet
the needs outlined in the solicitation.' 24 An award is then made to
the vendor offering the lowest price in a sealed bid competition and
satisfying the specifications. IFBs are used when the items to be
procured may be evaluated on just price-related factors. Furthermore,
specifications must be sufficiently clear that discussions and clarifications are unnecessary."z Finally, more than one bid must be reason26
ably expected.1

The standard form for the more complex and higher-valued negotiated procurement is the RFP (also called competitive negotiation).' 27 As with IFBs, the government announces mandatory speci-

121. Other procurement options exist. The FAA procurement of mainframe computers for
air traffic control consisted of a design competition followed by price bids as directed by
OMB Circular A-109. See KELMAN, supra note 1. Another alternative is the Request for
Quotations [hereinafter "RFQ']. See id.
122. CICA has been successful in discouraging inappropriate sole source procurement. See
supra Section LC.I. and accompanying notes.
123. Before CICA, there was a presumption in favor of sealed bidding, but under CICA,
only an IFB or RFP constitutes full and open procurement. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at
17.
124. Every characteristic of the proposed equipment must be documented, either with
specifications sheets, product brochures or manuals.
125. In Federal Sys. Group, Inc., GSBCA No. 9548-P B.C.A. (CCH)
93,454 (1988),
the GSBCA ruled that the contracting officer may waive minor informalities in a winning bid
as long as it is fully responsive to the IFB. This reduces the burden of the "no discussion"
requirement.
126. Regulations call for an IFB (1) when time permits, (2) when the award is made on
price and price-related data, (3) when no need to discuss the bids exists, and (4) when the
government has a reasonable expectation of receiving more than one bid. See Steven W.
Feldman, Traversing the Tightrope Between Meaningful Discussions and Improper Practices in
Negotiated Federal Acquisitions, 17 PuB. CoNT. L.. 211, 216 (1987).
127. Most ADPTE procurement is conducted via RFPs. See Gabig & Bean, supra note
24, at 553-68.
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fications for the ADPTE and potential vendors submit bids. Unlike a
response to an IFB, a proposal submitted by a firm is not necessarily
its f'mal bid. 2 1 Often, the agency conducts written or oral negotiations with all responsible offerors within a competitive range that is
determined by the procurement official.' 29 During this time, the procurement official gives the bidders an opportunity to correct deficient Firms in the competitive range revise
cies and clarify ambiguities."O
their bids and submit their Best and Final Offers (hereinafter
"BAFO"s).
In RFPs, bids are usually evaluated on quality as well as cost
measures.'
Typically, the RFP will enumerate certain desirable
specifications and assign points to offers containing those features. A
winning bid is often determined by summing the points received by
each proposal for technical merit and then choosing the proposal
offering the best value in terms of cost and quality. 3 1 Our description of these evaluation criteria is necessarily vague because the FAR
allows a fair amount of discretion in creating them. We will refer to
a common evaluation procedure that specifies precise 33weights for cost
and different quality attributes as a scoring function.1
The formulation of the specifications in both IFBs and RFPs is a
difficult process, often requiring substantial communication between
potential bidders and the agency. Vendors approach the procurement

128. The information in these offers is kept secret by the PO. See Feldman, supra note
126, at
129.
130.
bids in

218.
Bidders outside the competitive range are notified of rejection. See id.
The agency is specifically precluded from giving any information about competitors'
these negotiations, including the current rank of the bids. See ALSTON, supra note 15,

at 59. The PO is prevented from engaging in "auctioning" during negotiations. This means
that he can neither indicate to the vendor that a certain cost or price must be offered to

obtain further consideration of the vendor's proposal nor disclose a vendor's relative price
standing. See Gabig & Bean, supra note 24, at 575.
131. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. §§ 15.406 and 15.605 describe binary and
value RFPs. In the binary case, the low bid wins, while in the value case, highest surplus
wins. In less complex RFPs, a bidder states both price or cost and assent to the government
specifications, then ordinarily the contract is awarded to the low bidder. See ALSTON, supra
note 15, at 217.
132. See Joseph J. Petrillo, Cost Loses Heavyweight Status in Decisions, 10 GOV'T

COMPUTER NEWS 62 (1991) (stating that the GSA once required scoring functions to assign
70% of the weight to cost, but that this requirement has been dropped, and the importance
of cost among award criteria has been declining).

133. Point scoring is not required by the FAR and, if it is used, exact weights are not
required. However, the evaluation criteria had exact weights on cost versus quality in six of
Kelman's nine case studies. In the other three, exact weights were provided on the attributes
determining quality, but not on cost versus quality. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 56.
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officials at the agency in an attempt to inform them about their products and demonstrate the quality of the match between their products
and the agency's demand for computational services. Vendors also
contact the POs at the procuring agency to ask clarifying questions
regarding the RFP or IFB. If the questions indicate an unanticipated
problem with the procurement, alterations are made to the RPP or
IFB. These changes are announced publicly by the procuring agency.
If a potential bidder determines that the solicitation contains specifications that hurt its chances of success, it may petition the contracting
officer to relax the specifications. The firms may submit as many
questions about the solicitation as they wish, as long as the contracting officer receives them before the due date. Usually, the contracting
officer will provide copies of all questions and answers to all prospective bidders and, often, these questions result in amendments to
the solicitation.
POs exercise substantial discretion in determining specifications
and evaluation criteria. The specifications announced in an RFP or
IFB have a crucial impact on the economic efficiency of a procurement. By establishing mandatory specifications, the government induces a minimal list of attributes that a viable vendor must offer in a
proposal. The more rigorous the specifications, the smaller the number
of potential bidders. Furthermore, the specifications, as a reflection of
the PO's perception of the government's needs, establish the costquality trade-off that the government is willing to make.
Despite the apparent rigidity of the award process where a scoring function is used, POs have a fair amount of latitude at the evaluation stage. Quality assessments may be subjective when attributes
such as user-friendliness are being considered. Furthermore, the
benchmark testing that is often used to evaluate the technical claims
of vendors may be quite subjective."
C.

The Protest Process

In this section, we describe protest law with an eye toward the
use of protest as an oversight mechanism designed to rein in agency
problems. The first avenue for relief for the aggrieved bidder exists
through an informal protest to the contracting officer.'35 In-house

134. A PO may test just the winning bidder or all bidders in the competitive range. See
Gabig & Bean, supra note 24, at 578-79.
135. Few agencies have enacted formal protest procedures. Usually, a protester files a
grievance with a contracting officer who then advises all parties relevant to the matter and
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protests before the contract award are relatively easy to process and
resolve; in most instances, specific regulations exist to correct mistakes and biases in the award process. 136 Often, a protest brought
informally to the agency can achieve greater results than any of the
formal protest mechanisms. 13 7 As Professors Nash and Cibinic write:
One of the advantages of protesting within the agency is that the
matter is usually reviewed at a level higher than the contracting
officer. In addition a legal review normally occurs so that decisions
based upon improper interpretation of statutes or regulations can be
corrected. Generally, there are no restrictions preventing the agency
from granting requested relief following such review. 3 '
If the aggrieved bidder decides to pursue the matter through
more established forums, three formal alternatives exist: the federal
courts; the GAO; or the GSBCA. We first examine the opportunities
to protest in the federal courts at the Claims Court and in the district
courts. The Claims Court is available for pre-award protests and the
district courts for post-award protests. 39 Neither are very satisfactory as oversight tools because of conservative standards of review and
narrow standing rules.
Although the Court of Claims was responsible for hearing disputes between the federal government and its contractors, it was not
hospitable to bid protest claims. So, in 1982, Congress enacted the
Federal Courts Improvement Act (hereinafter "FCIA"), 140 which
opened the door a crack to bid protest cases at the successor to the
Court of Claims.' 4' FCIA created the new Claims Court and gave

receives responses to the facts of the award and the protest. Upon resolution of these informal procedures, the contracting officer can either decide the matter, forward the case to his
or her superiors within the agency or refer it to the GAO and the Comptroller General.
136. See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 33.103 (1990).
137. Normally, a protest should begin informally at the agency level. This has the advantage of reducing ill-will and avoiding the red tape of a formal protest. See Gabig, supra note
49, at 38.
138. NASH & CIMNIC, supra note 104, at 1008.

139. There is no standing to challenge lock-out specifications in federal district court
before an award. See Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981). To
get equitable relief in the Claims Court, a party must file before an award to have standing.
See Gregg A. Day, The Bid Protest Jurisdiction of the United States Claims Court: A
Proposalfor Resolving Ambiguities, 15 PUB. CONT. L.L 325 (1984).
140. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).

141. Courts initially allowed the waiver of sovereign immunity only for monetary damages through section 1491(a)(1). In Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct.
Cl. 1956), the court allowed preparation costs to unsuccessful bidders upon showing of
improprieties and bad faith by the government; see also Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States,
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the forum sovereign immunity for cases under its jurisdiction and the
ability to grant equitable relief under limited circumstances.142
Claims Court jurisdiction has been given to those standing in a contractual relationship with the government: "Jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded .

.

upon any

express or implied contract with the United States ..
2143 The
scope of section 1491(a)(3) was quickly delineated by the circuit
court in United States v. John C. Grimberg Co.'4 Chief Judge
Markey stated that the term "contract claim" in subsection (a)(3) (of
the FCIA) "indicates reliance or an implied contract to have the involved bids fairly and honestly considered ...
,,145 Thus, a bid
protest action could now be entertained in the Claims Court if an
implied-in-fact contract existed between the government and the unsuccessful bidder, despite previous standing problems.
The FCIA and Griinberg represent minimal progress in creating
an effective bid protest forum at the Claims Court. Compared to the
GSBCA

protest

process,

46

both standing

47

and remedies 14 '

are

limited. More importantly,
review is restricted by the arbitrary or
49
capricious standard.

492 F.2d 1200 (Ct. Cl. 1975). Yet, before 1982, section 1491(a)(1) did not waive sovereign
immunity for equitable relief. See United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1969). Thus, the
bid protest action, which calls for equitable adjustment, was not allowed in the Court of
Claims despite the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties.
142. 28 U.S.C. section 1491(a)(3) (1983) empowered the new court with "exclusive
jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments and such equitable and extraordinary relief as it
deems proper, including but not limited to injunctive relief."
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
144. 702 F.2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
145. Id. at 1367.
146. See supra notes 110-24 and accompanying text.
147. The Claims Court has elaborated on the Federal Circuit's Grimnberg analysis and
enunciated several prerequisites for an equitable claim that arises out of the contractual nature
of relief contemplated by the FCIA. For example, the plaintiff must have actually bid on the
proposed project, see Indian Wells Valley Metal Trades Council v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct.
43 (1982), the bid must actually be submitted to the government to complete the implicit
contractual relationship, see Hero, Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 413 (1983) (holding that
mere expenditure of effort and money in preparation for a bid without actual submission will
not suffice), and the submitted bid must be in response and must conform to the essential
requirements of the solicitation. Yachts America v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 447 (1983); see
also Coburn, The Decline of the Bid Protest Remedy in the Federal Courts Since the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 19 NAT'L CONT. MGMT. J. 1,6 (1985) (footnote omitted)
(reprinted in 23 Y.B. PROCuREMENT ARTICL.ES 285-93 (1986)).
148. The Claims Court will not direct an award as a remedy. See Day, supra note 139,
at 325.
149. The Claims Court does not have jurisdiction when the issue is whether or not the
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The district courts have implemented a broader interpretation of
standing requirements for bid protest actions than has the Claims
Court. In these courts, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by
an agency action may sue for equitable relief. The jurisdictional basis
for determining who may sue in the district court falls under the
Administrative Procedure Act."5° Although standing is more broadly
" ' the same deferential standard of
guaranteed by the district courts,15
52
applies to the district courts.
Claims
of
review used by the Court
The General Accounting Office (hereinafter "GAO"), created in
1921 by the Budget and Accounting Act,' 53 functions to review and
control expenditures by the Executive branch."5 Based on this mandate the Comptroller had inferred the authority of the GAO to consider bid protests. Uncertainty regarding the GAO's bid protest authority
continued until 1984, when specific authority was codified by the passage of CICA. 155 Although CICA strengthened the GAO as a pro-

solicitation was written fairly. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 373 (1983)
(holding that "[tihe jurisdiction of the court under section 1491(a)(3) is limited to situations
where a bid complies with the terms of a bid invitation but is, nevertheless, not fully or fairly considered . . . Since our injunctive authority turns upon the existence of a contractual
authority . . . a duty owed by virtue of statute or regulation cannot . . . justify the exercise

of that authority."); see also Hero, Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 413 (1983) (non-bidder
challenged an IFB that failed to comply with statutes and regulations, but the Claims Court
found no jurisdiction).
150. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1991). In the landmark case of Scanwell Lab., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424
F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970), an unsuccessful contractor who lost an award had jurisdiction for
the first time to seek equitable relief through judicial channels. The Scanwell court avoided
infringing on the Claims Court's turf by noting that "[t]he 'exclusive jurisdiction' vested in
the Claims Court applies only to actions founded upon a 'contract claim.' Scanwell actions
are not based on such claims; rather, they are founded upon an alleged violation of Section
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act." Richard A. Smith, Government Contracts: ConrestIng the Federal Government's Award Decision, 20 NEW ENG. L. REV. 31, 35 (1984-85)
(footnotes omitted) (reprinted in 22 Y.B. PROCUREMENT ARTCLES 443-71 (1985)); see also
Spectrum Leasing Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that, in
contract actions, the APA cannot confer jurisdiction on the district courts where the claim
falls outside concurrent jurisdiction). Thus, the district courts, through the elaboration of the
Scanwell analysis, have allowed only equitable relief through permanent injunctions or declaratory judgments as the proper remedies for aggrieved bidders.
151. Recall that district court jurisdiction is limited to agency acts during the evaluation
and award process.
152. See Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
153. 31 U.S.C. §§ 711-20 (1991). The Act authorizes the Comptroller General to settle
all claims and accounts of the United States and to determine the legality of expenditures for
a variety of contracts entered into by the government.
154. See Id.
155. Under CICA, the GAO retained most of its previous jurisdictional power, but
remained limited to pursuing claims and accounts within its express settlement authority and
to bid protest involving federal agencies. CICA halted the gradual erosion of GAO's power
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test forum, it also created a rival forum in the GSBCA. The new
rival has been successful in displacing the GAO as the main forum
for ADPTE protests. Several factors militate against GAO forum
selection, most notably the success rate for protests,' 5 6 the informal
procedures utilized for protest actions" and the limited remedial
power derived only through advisory opinions. 5 8
CICA provided aggrieved firms participating in federal
procurements of ADPTE with the right to protest decisions of the
procuring agency to the GSBCA.5 9 Unlike the GAO or in-house
protest forums, the GSBCA has discovery procedures and significant
enforcement powers. Furthermore, the method of review at the
GSBCA is de novo, '" while the other forums typically view the
discretionary
decisions of procurement personnel as exempt from chal61
lenge.1
The standing rules at the GSBCA are more permissive than those
at other protest forums. CICA allows any interested party to file its
protest against an award of an ADPTE contract to the GSBCA. The
Board has proved to be much more liberal than the GAO in the
interpretation of an "interested party." In the GSBCA case 9338p, 62 the board allowed a protest by a bidder in less than second-

in government contract claims to the individual boards of appeal.
156. Cancellation was rarely used by the GAO. In 1981, it heard 613 post-award protests
and ordered cancellation only ten times. See Day, supra note 139, at 365. Based on fiscal
year 1983 decisions rendered on their merits, protestors had a success rate of 14.4% before
the GAO. Post-CICA, in fiscal year 1985, the GAO protester success rate was 18.7%. See
Gabig, supra note 49, at 39.
157. Richard J. Webber, Bid Protests and Agency Discretion: Where and Why do the
GSBCA and GAO Part Company?, 18 PuB. CONT. L.J. 1, 22 (1988) (contending that,
"[p]rocedurally, the ability of a protester in the Board [GSBCA] to utilize the various avenues of discovery-interrogatories, production of documents, depositions and admissions-greatly improves the chances of success [relative to the GAO].").
158. See W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 269 (1990).
159. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2713, 98 Stat.
1175, 1182 (1984).
160. Lanier Business Products, Inc., 85-2 BCA
18,033 at 90,946; see also Webber,
supra note 157, at 3-4.
161. As noted by the GSBCA in its first decision, -presumptions of agency correctness
as sometimes applied at the GAO in the course of deciding protests cannot be permitted
here." Lanier Business Prods., Inc., GSBCA No. 7702-P, 85-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
18,033 at
90,466 (1985); see also John R. Tolle, A Review of the First Year of ADP Bid Protests at
the GSBCA, 16 PUB. CONT. L.J. 120, 136 (1986) (stating that the Board determines de novo
whether an agency has violated a statute, regulation or DPA by a preponderance of the
evidence. The GAO, district courts, and the Claims Court uphold agency decisions unless
there is an abuse of discretion.).
162. ATS, Inc., GSBCA No. 9338-P, 88-1 B.C.A. (CCI-)
20,467 at 92,900 (1988).
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place standing, while in GAO case B-229836,' 6' a protest by a
third-place bidder was not permitted.'6
The timing of protests is strictly controlled by the Board. Protests concerning the restrictiveness of specifications, the nature of the
scoring function or other issues concerning the method of procurement must be filed within ten working days from when they become
apparent.' 65 Of course, protests addressing the evaluation and award
process must occur post-award. There are important legal and economic differences, as we note below, between pre- and post-award
protests.
In addition to filing a protest, any interested party can intervene
on the side of the protester or on the side of the government. In postaward protests, awardees will often intervene on the side of the agency to protect their award. Any offeror that intervenes on the side of
the protester and that has the same basis as the protester for involvement is entitled to the same benefits from a successful protest as the
original protester."
The remedies available to protesters at the GSBCA are varied
and substantial. Once a protest is filed with the GSBCA, the procurement is suspended 67 upon the timely request of the protester until
the Board reaches a decision (less than 45 days) or the case is withdrawn. 68 If a protest is not withdrawn and goes to the Board for a
decision, a number of results are possible. The Board can dismiss the
protest, finding in favor of the procuring agency. If the Board upholds the protest, the protester will often be reimbursed for bid prepa-

163. System-Analytics Group Corp., Comp. Gen. B-229836, Gov't Cont. Rep. (CCH)
101,819 (1988).
164. The standing rules at the Board have been narrowed recently by decisions of the
Federal Circuit. See infra Section II.E.3.
165. See Tolle, supra note 161, at 128 (pointing to the fact that Board Rule 5(b)(3)(i)
states that "a protest based on solicitation improprieties must be filed before the closing date
for initial proposals.").
166. See LEONARD SUCHANEK & JOSEPH VER IUO, PROTESTS AT THE GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 18 (1989).
167. See Steven W. Feldman, Interim Suspension Authority of the General Services Board
of Contract Appeals in Automatic Data Protests: Legal and PracticalConsiderations, 17 PuB.
CONT. L.. 1, 12 (1987) (stating that the GSBCA will impose a suspension of the procurement for a pre-award protest unless the government can show that a vital national interest is
at stake; mere showing of expense and delay is not enough). Thus, the GSBCA has the
power to suspend contracts temporarily, unless the government can show "urgent and compelling circumstances" that significantly affect the interests of the United States. See LATHAM,
supra note 108, at 20-24.
168. See SUCHANEK & VEROILIO, supra note 166, at 3.
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ration expenses and legal fees from the Permanent Indefinite Judgment Fund (hereinafter "PIJF"). 169 In addition, the Board can order
that. the RFP or IFB be altered to bring it into compliance with procurement statutes and regulations. 7 ' In the case of a post-award
protest, the Board can direct the award to the protester, or it can
order the procuring agency to set aside the award decision and start
the evaluation of the bids anew.' 7 ' Even if the government cancels
a procurement, the Board can order a re-solicitation and still judge
the protest. 172 Alternatively, the Board can declare the procurement
to be so seriously flawed that it must be restarted from scratch. 7 3
With respect to the procuring agency, the Board may or may not
require it to reimburse the PIJF for payments made to a successful
protester. 74 While the GSBCA does not have contempt power to
enforce its rulings, the GSA has authority over all Brooks Act
procurements. If the Board deems that the procuring agency has consciously acted in a manner that is counter to the interests of taxpayers
(and procurement law), then it will often suspend the Delegated Procurement Authority (DPA) of the agency, requiring the agency to
obtain pre-authorization of all procurement decisions from the
GSA. 175

169. See id. at 8; see also Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Groups, 819 F.2d
277 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that the Board does not award bid preparation costs unless the
government's action caused the firm to incur the costs unnecessarily); Bedford Computer
Corp., GSBCA No. 9837-C (9742-P), 90-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
22,377 (1989) (stating that
"[c]osts are not appropriate in cases involving minor technicalities.").
18,289 (1985);
170. See Memorex Corp., GSBCA No. 7927-P, 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH)
Genasys Corp., GSBCA No. 8734-P, 87-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
19,556 (1986). The Board can
also compel an agency to rewrite a specification or cancel a procurement and begin anew.
See Sugawara & Tucker, supra note 99.
20,400 (1987)
171. See Computer Data Sys., GSBCA No. 9217-P, 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
(stating that "directed awards are an exceptional form of relief . . . ."); see also SMS Data
23,464 (1990). The Board
Prods. Group, Inc., GSBCA No. 10864-P, 91-1 B.C.A. (CCII)
will direct awards only where there are two competitors and the protester would have received the award but for the violation. See id.
172. See Tolle, supra note 161, at 126.
18,289 (1985).
173. See Memorex Corp., GSBCA No. 7927-P, 85-3 B.C.A. (CCI-)
174. 40 U.S.C. § 759 (f)(5)(1988). See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Trading Co.-Sys. Div.,
GSBCA No. 10047-C (10027-P), 91-2 B.C.A. (CCII) 23,796 (1991) (Agency's DPA revised
to require it to reimburse the PIJF).
18,592
175. See Computer Mktg. Corp., GSBCA No. 8131-P, 86-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
(1985); see also Tolle, supra note 161, at 153 (stating that after an agency cancelled a
procurement, the Board modified the DPA for the following year. If the agency wanted to
purchase ADPTE, it would have to get special permission from the GSA.). See Gabig, supra
note 49, at 36 (stating that the DPA gives the GSA considerable power over agency
procurements; therefore, threats of revocation are taken seriously).
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The Impact of Protests

In this section, we bring together our analysis of agency problems, knowledge of the ADPTE procurement process, and evidence of
changes in that process since 1984 to evaluate the success of protests.
We examine different stages of the procurement process at which POs
exercise discretion and indicate which agency problems might compromise that discretion. We then look to the cases and other evidence
to see when protests are successful in correcting or deterring malfeasance.
At the very outset of the procurement process, an agency determines, and Congress ratifies, a strategy for satisfying an agency's
demand for ADPTE services. For example, in Masstor Systems Corp.,
NASA decided that it needed a "mass storage system to be used as a
node on [a] local area network ... .",76 This sort of judgment is
beyond the scope of the protest process." Unfortunately, however,
the quantity and variety of ADPTE products that an agency will
purchase may be affected by a technology bias. Taxpayers must look
to Congress and the Administration to oversee these global budget
decisions.
Once the purpose of the acquisition has been determined, the
contracting and technical officers draft an RFP (or other solicitation)
stating mandatory specifications. This is the first stage at which protests become relevant. All three of the agency problems may lead to
overly restrictive specifications. In the case of favoritism, the terms
"wired" or "lock-out" are used to describe specifications that are
written to favor a particular firm." 8 Given the complexity of
ADPTE, a p0179 operating with a technology bias or appropriability
176.

Masstor Sys. Corp. GSBCA No. 8669-P, 87-1 B.C.A. (CCH)

19,435 (1986).

177. In Data Gen. Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied
sub nor. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 111 S.Ct 2011 (1991), the Federal Circuit overruled
the Board's attempt to preclude a USGS computer award. The Board found that the award
was tainted by a technology bias. It described the agency's specifications as "incredibly
stupid" and questioned whether the agency wanted to be charged inevitably higher prices for
software packages that would rarely be used. The Federal Circuit refuted the Board's claims
that the specifications were irrational and warned the Board that section 759(e) of the Brooks
Act specifically prohibits the Board from imposing its views about ADPTE needs on the
agency. See Id.
178. This appears to have been the case in Motorola Computer Sys., GSBCA No. 859619,309 (1986) (stating that the exclusionary requirement that the
P, 86-3 B.C.A. (CCH)
display of the field number be on the status line, as opposed to elsewhere on the screen was

held to be incompatible with minimum needs).
179. Recall that our "PO" is actually a composite of contract and technical officers. The
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problem can include design specifications that can be met only by a
single firm or a small number of firms."s
In Masstor, a protester challenged the requirement that an optical
rather than magnetic storage system be provided.' Such a restriction could be the result of a bias in favor of the more sophisticated
technology embodied in the optical system. The Board studied the
agency's purpose in procuring the equipment and concluded that the
restriction was not improper."
This finding is significant for two
reasons. First, it shows that the Board is willing to review the type of
judgments that are most likely to effectuate a technology bias.'
Second, it should alert the reader to a difficult boundary issue concerning the Board's jurisdiction. One could argue that the decision to
use optical storage was the determination of the variety of ADPTE to
procure and not simply one of many specifications
necessary to im4
plement plans to procure a mass storage system.18
The protester in Masstor won the protest on the grounds of
organizational conflict of interest.' 85 The conflict arose because
NASA hired Lockheed to assist in the development of the solicitation.

threat of protests is felt acutely by contract officers, but is rather remote from the interest of
technical officers. Thus, the deterrent effect of protests is successful to the extent that contract officers, in their negotiations with the technical officers, succeed in obtaining specifications and scoring functions that are consistent with CICA. Protests also work to deter contract
officers from making inappropriate evaluation assessments. Deterrence is most likely to fail
with regard to those aspects of benchmark testing and bid evaluation performed by technical
officers that are outside the expertise or control of contract officers.
180. POs can choose from many types of specifications: functional; equipment performances; plug-to-plug compatible; brand name or equal; or make and model. See Federal
Information Resources Management Regulations (hereinafter "FIR.MR"), 41 C.F.R. § 20130.013 (1990) (listing, in descending order of preference, the types of specifications that may
be used). In theory, agencies should be prepared to justify using other than functional specifications, since federal regulations express a preference for them. See Gabig, supra note 49, at
56. But before CICA, this preference was honored mostly in the breach. Id
181. Masstor Sys. Corp., GSBCA No. 7927-8, 85-3 B.C.A. (CCII)
19,435 (1986).
182. Id.
183. Whether the Board made the correct judgment in this case is beyond our expertise,
but the evidence below shows the aggregate favorable impact of Board decisions.
184. See Masstor Sys. Corp., GSBCA No. 8669-P, 87-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
19,435 (1986)
(LaBella, J., concurring). As a second example, consider a PO afflicted by a technology bias
who is intent on procuring a minicomputer. If the PO makes the false claim that the
agency's duties require complex analysis of engineering problems, then an RFP excluding
work stations and PCs would not be challenged by the GSBCA. However, the PO would not
be successful in claiming that minicomputers are necessary for the agency's word processing
requirements. The difference is that in the second case the specifications are too restrictive in
light of the stated need.
185. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:1

Lockheed, in turn, permitted Filetek, a subcontractor, to draft proposal
specifications. NASA adopted these specifications with little change.
Although thirty-five firms requested copies of the solicitation, only
one submitted a bid-Filetek. The GSBCA granted the protest and
barred an award to Filetek under the original solicitation. 8 6
In addition to mandatory specifications, the solicitation contains
evaluation criteria constituting what we have called a scoring function. The weights in the scoring function can be selected to reflect
the PO's personal preferences over product attributes, to favor a particular vendor, or to reflect a bias toward high technology. An abuse
of discretion in this area is difficult for the Board to detect. Thus, the
Board has stated that it will not challenge the weight placed on cost
versus technical attributes in a scoring function.
Although protest cannot reach this problem, other features of
CICA have had an impact. CICA's introduction of "competition advocates" into agencies and its praise of "full and open competition" has
had an impact in diminishing the technology bias. The GAO reports
that even in non-ADPTE areas (where there are no GSBCA protests),
CICA has given contract officers "more authority of influence" 18887
by making cost considerations more important in contract awards.
Recall from the discussion in Section I.B.8 9 that the contract officer
is paired with a technical officer in a bargain over the weight to give
cost in the scoring function. Thus, there is some control over the
technology bias that manifests itself in the scoring function."9°
The third important source of discretion in managing an ADPTE
procurement is product testing and evaluation. Evaluations may involve fuzzy technical judgments about the merits of differing solu-

186. Examples of other GSBCA cases that were based upon overly restrictive specifications are: North Am. Automated Sys. Co., GSBCA No. 7967-P, 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH)
18,290; International Sys. Mktg., Inc., GSBCA No. 7948-P, 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH)
18,196
(1985); Computer Mktg. Corp., GSBCA No. 8131-P-R, 86-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
18,592 (1986);
Vanguard Technologies Corp., GSBCA No. 8885-P, 87-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
19,814 (1987); and
Tetra Industries, Inc., GSBCA No. 8168-P, 86-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
18,591 (1985). These cases
are discussed in SUCHANmm & VERGIuo, supra note 166.
187. See GAO Report, Procurement: Better Compliance with the Competition in Contracting Act Is Needed, GAO/NSIAD-87-145, at 72 (1987).
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
190. Our analysis in this section makes it clear that protests are less effective in subduing the technology bias as compared to favoritism or the appropriability problem. Although a
PO may be thwarted from giving effect to the bias through mandatory specifications, evaluations or testing, there may still be plenty of room to give effect to the bias in the formulation of procurement demands or the formulation of weights in the scoring function.
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tions to information management problems. 9 ' In the evaluation of
the bids and/or products described in the bids, the PO could take
actions that are contrary to those that are described in the RFP or
IFB.'" For example, the RFP may indicate that volume discounts
are a very important part of the bid, yet the PO places little weight
on them when "scoring" the bids. 93 Alternatively, products tests, as
described in the RFP, may be applied or considered selectively in
order that the PO's preferred product will be chosen." 9 Bias evaluations invariably stem from a technology bias or favoritism."
Looking at the process generally, we perceive a significant impact on ADPTE procurements over the past eight years." The
RFPs and IFBs that are issued now for federal ADPTE procurements
are far less restrictive than they were eight years ago, permitting

191. In Contel Fed. Sys., Inc., GSBCA No. 9743-P, 89-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 21,458 (1988),
an RFP that gave only modest weight to user-friendliness in word processing software
resulted in an award to a product that was very unfriendly. To prevent that product from
being chosen, the PO altered the weight in the RFP. The GSBCA nullified the contract
18,102
award. In International Sys. Mktg., Inc., GSBCA No.7860-P, 85-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
(1985), a brand name or equivalent monitor was specified. The brand name had higher
resolution in text display mode than that of the protester, but they had equally good graphics
resolution. The government claimed that it wanted high text resolution and disqualified the
lower priced protester. The GSBCA reinstated the protester, stating that the government
should have specified text resolution if that is what it wanted. The Board rescinded the
purchase authority and told the agency that it could purchase from the protestor if it wanted
to purchase at all.
192. See, e.g., Systemhouse Fed. Sys. GSBCA No. 9313-P, 88-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,603
19,781 (1987);
(1988); Compuware Corp., GSBCA No. 8869-P, 87-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
19,556 (1986); Computervision
Genasys Corp., GSBCA No. 8734-P, 87-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
19,553 (1986). Detailed discussions of
Corp., GSBCA No. 8744-P, 87-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
these cases can be found in SUCHANEK & VERGIUO, supra note 156.
193. See, e.g., Pacific Bell v. United States, 865 F.2d 269 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming
Pacific Bell, GSBCA No. 9252-P and GSBCA No. 9488-P (9280-P)).
194. See, e.g., Storage Technology Corp., GSBCA No. 8691-P, 87-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
19,953 (1987).
195. See Laffont & Tirole, supra note 48.
196. There is evidence that CICA has increased competition across all federal procurement, not just ADPTE. See GAO Report, supra note 187, at 3-5. (CICA has contributed to
an increase in the percentage of contracts awarded competitively.) POs have commented that
CICA made the process "more competitive and reduced potential procurement abuses." Id at
72. In the area of ADPTE, the effect of CICA is most pronounced. One-third of recent major
ADPTE contracts have been protested. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 22. At GAO, the
success rate for protesters is about 10%, while at GSBCA, the success rate has been about
50%. Id. at 24. We believe that this protest activity is a factor responsible for the fact that
profit margins in private sector computer businesses are higher than in government businesses,
1d. at 84, and 65% of major government contracts are awarded to the lowest price vendor, as
compared to 41% in the private sector. Id. at 60. These cost savings apparently have not
been achieved by resorting to primitive technology.
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larger numbers of firms to participate."9 Questionable practices of
POs, such as favoring particular vendors 98 or biasing product evaluations towards excessively high technology items, have been both
deterred and corrected by the GSBCA protest process. 199 In addition, GSBCA protests have provided the makers of new or unique
products, whose exclusion from federal ADPTE procurements was
often a fait accompli, a means to gain access into *the federal ADPTE
market.2"°
E. Issues in Protest Law
Most of the issues discussed in this section arise either directly
or indirectly from the occurrence of inappropriate settlements.
1. Alleviating Protest Problems
In this section, we return to the problems with the protest process as discussed in Section I.C.2., and show that they can be substantially alleviated by appropriate policy design. The policy tools that
we consider are the allocation of protest costs and the control of
protest settlement.
The phenomena of fedmail and overdeterrence are susceptible to
a policy of reducing the cost of protest to a successful PO. Ideally,
this cost should be zero. If it is, then a PO could never be dissuaded
from making an appropriate award or induced to agree to a fedmail
settlement because of the fear of a costly protest. Practically, agencies
could be reimbursed for legal costs but it would be difficult to compensate them for the delay associated with a protest. Fortunately, the

197. "The increase in the frequency of protests induced the EPA to move in the direction of specifying all weights in an RFP because disappointed bidders are less likely to
protest." KEILMAN, supra note 1, at 170; see also Gabig, supra note 49, at 43 (stating that
"(t]he ominous threat of a GSBCA protest has had a prophylactic impact on the acquisition
process. Federal agencies have become more conscientious about properly conducting
procurements for information systems."); Sugawara & Tucker, supra note 99, at A-i (stating
that protests allow small firms to compete on equal grounds with large ones).
198. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that IBM's share among Fortune 1000
finns is 76%, compared to 34% in the federal government).
199. See Bruce Adkins & Jack Daley, Strategies for Business Development in the Federal
Marketplace, 31 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PROF.SSIONAL Comm. 57 (1988) (stating that "the

process of getting business and remaining an incumbent is getting more difficult."); see also

KELMAN, supra note 1, at 7-8 (78% of recent major contracts in the private sector went to
incumbent firms, as compared to 58% in federal procurement); id. at 8 (28% of procurements
in the private sector were sole source, while none of the procurements in the government in
Kelman's survey of computer managers were sole source).
200. See supra note 48.
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brief time limits imposed on the protest process keep delay costs
down.
The probability of deterrence and bluffmg can also be controlled
through protest cost allocation. Successful protesters are compensated
for their bid preparation and protest costs in order to enhance the
deterrent power of protests. Greater deterrence could also be achieved
by sanctioning agencies responsible for repeated or egregious violations of procurement law.2° '
Lastly, we argue that inappropriate settlements 2" can be diminished by control of protest settlements. From a theoretical point of
view, the ideal solution would be to include a taxpayer representative
in any settlement bargain. Practically, abuses of the protest process
might be best handled by requiring GSBCA supervision of protest
settlement. '°
The idea of regulating a mutually beneficial exchange seems
counter to both good legal practice and the concept of efficiency from
basic microeconomics. Consider a typical suit in which one party has
been harmed. If the two parties can reach a mutually beneficial cash
settlement prior to trial, then they are both better off because litigation costs are avoided. The difference in the case of protests is that
the taxpayer is an unrepresented party to the bargain. In other words,
there is a negative externality from the settlement.

201. The impact of this latter measure is attenuated, though, because it would be accompanied by a reduction in the probability of protest. This reduction would result because
firms would become more pessimistic about their chances of winning protests. They would
reason that sanctions imposed on violators would deter most POs from making a bad award
and, thereby, reduce the profitability of protests.
202. In Section LC.2., we provided definitions of appropriate versus inappropriate cash
settlements. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
203. Currently, the ability of the Board to supervise settlements is severely limited. See
Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In that
case, the parties reached a settlement after the GSBCA granted a protest. The settlement
allowed continued illegal activity and the Board refused to dismiss the protest. See SMS Data
Prods. Group, GSBCA No. 8589-P, 87-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 19,637 (1987). The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, arguing that promotion of settlements is a good
idea. See Federal Data Corp., 819 F.2d at 277. However, the board retains control over the
protest cost decision. See Bedford Computer Corp., GSBCA No. 9837-C (9742-P), 89-2
21,827 (1989). In this case, a protest was dismissed without prejudice
B.C.A. (CCH)
following settlement between the Army and the protestor. Bedford sought compensation for its
bid preparation and protest costs from the Permanent Indefinite Judgment Fund (PLTF), 31
U.S.C. § 1304. The Army failed to notify Bedford of its exclusion from the competitive
range. The Board felt that it could not let the Army use PIJF as an alternative to correcting
improprieties. Id. at 5. If a government settlement admits a violation or provides a benefit
promoting full and open competition, then protest costs may be awarded. rd.
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The externality problem present in the protest scenario has been
addressed by the Supreme Court in another area of the law. In the
case of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,2" the Court established a policy designed to discourage settlements when the issue of patent validity was
in contention. The settlement of a patent dispute may enrich the party
seeking to invalidate a patent, but it subverts the public policy in
favor of testing the validity of questionable monopoly-producing patent grants. Likewise, inappropriate settlements of procurement protests
should be discouraged in order to foster the private attorney general
role of protesters.
Regulation of cash settlements by procuring agencies is simple
and desirable. In fact, the negative publicity from the cash settlement
made by the Bureau of the Census to three protesters in 1988 has
effectively eliminated explicit inappropriate cash settlements by procuring agencies. 5 However, there is little inhibiting the procuring
agencies from shifting the burden of inappropriate settlements onto
the awardee (with implicit compensation during the course of the
contract).
To stop such circumvention by procuring agencies, inter-firm
cash and in-kind settlements should also be regulated."t° Enforcement would be more difficult than with agency cash settlements. If
the awardee and protester have other business dealings, e.g., a joint
venture or subcontracting relationship, they may be able to disguise
the settlement transfer. An obvious but critical feature of GSBCA
regulation of the settlement process is that the judges have access to
the information obtained in discovery. Approval of a settlement would
be granted only upon a finding that the taxpayers' interests would be
promoted-or at least not harmed.
2. Collusion
The intent of the protest process is to oversee procurement.
However, the objective of the firms that instigate protests is not sur-

204. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
205. See supra note 85.
206. This proposal gains further support in light of the dangers of collusion discussed in
section II.E.2. An example of both agency participation in settlements and using a named
awardee to disburse payments in order to avoid public scrutiny is provided by Department of
Justice's Project Eagle procurement. The Department paid $200,000 to the named awardee
(Tisoft, Inc.) to facilitate settlements. The settlement payments by Tisoft, Inc. to the three
protesters were estimated by the House Judiciary Committee to be in excess of $6 million.
DEFICIENCIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AWARD AND MANAGEMENT OF ITS PROJECT
EAGLE ADP PROCUREMENT, H.R. REP. NO. 393, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss1/1

52

Marshall et al.: The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procureme
1991]

PROCUREMENT OVERSIGHT BY PROTEST

plus maximization to the government but, rather, their own profit
maximization. Sometimes increasing the profits of a firm coincides
with surplus maximization for the government. In such circumstances
the protest process is functioning at its best. Unfortunately, profit
maximization can lead firms to undertake protests for reasons that are
substantially different from, and fundamentally opposed to, surplus
maximization for the government. Inappropriate settlement and
overdeterrence are examples that we have already discussed. Another
possibility exists when firms use the protest process to facilitate bidder collusion. 2" Colluding bidders would attempt to both raise the
price paid by the government for a commodity and lower the quality
and quantity offered at a given price. Clearly, neither of these objectives of a bidder coalition are consistent with surplus maximization
for the government.
What actions would a coalition of bidders take at a federal procurement? Loosely put, they must decide what bid to submit and how
to divide the gain from collusive behavior among their members." 8
Suppose that Firms A, B and C collude. Based upon some criterion,
which we will not try to specify here, they decide that Firm A will
submit the best bid from among the three of them. Dividing the
collusive gain could be accomplished in a number of ways. In a
repeated procurement setting, we could see "winner-takes-all," with a
rotation established among the three firms for being the highest surplus bidder on a sequence of procurements (along the lines of the
"phases of the moon" conspiracy) .2 9 Alternatively, the difference
between Firm A's bid and what Firm A would have bid had it acted

207. Federal procurement rules, statutes and the FAR direct agencies to contact the Attorney General regarding evidence of antitrust violations in bids. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §
2305(b)(5) (1988); 41 U.S.C. § 253b(e) (1988); 48 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (1988); 48 C.F.R. §
3.301(b) (1988); see also KOVACIC, supra note 75, at 8 (stating that the prime contractor is
forbidden to enter into an agreement with a subcontractor that unreasonably restricts direct
sales by the subcontractor to the government).
208. For a discussion of the economics of bidder collusion at second price and English
auctions, see generally Daniel A. Graham & Robert C. Marshall, Collusive Bidder Behavior
at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions, 95 J. POL ECON. 1217 (1987); Daniel
A. Graham et al., Differential Payments Within a Bidder Coalition and the Shapley Value, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 493 (1990); George J. Mailath & Peter Zemsky, Collusion in Second Price
Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders, 3 GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 467 (1991). For a
discussion of the economics of bidder collusion at first price auctions, see generally R.
Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Bidding Rings, University of Western Ontario, Department
of Economics Working Paper (1988).
209. Bid rotation plans are sometimes facilitated by side-payments or subcontracts. See,
e.g., United States v. David E. Thompson, Inc., 621 F.2d 1147, 1149 (1st Cir. 1980).
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non-cooperatively could be divided, perhaps equally, amongst the
three firms. However, problems exist with arrangements like these.
First, with a "winner-takes-all" bid rotation conspiracy, Firm B might
try to cheat by submitting a bid that is slightly better than Firm A's
collusive bid and win the contract for itself outright. In other words,
Firm B might find it profitable to not wait its turn. With side-payments among the colluding firms, the possibility of this occurring is
greatly diminished. However, explicit side-payments are not desirable
in an environment with active antitrust enforcement, since they leave
a paper trail. This argues in favor of "winner-takes-all" collusive
arrangements in which the members rotate in winning contracts-an
inherently unstable kind of collusion relative to one where (1) sidepayments are made and, consequently, (2) there is less need (or even
no need) for members to "take turns" in winning contracts.
From the perspective of a bidder coalition, the protest process
provides legal mechanisms for conducting business and thereby enhances their stability. Side-payments among members of the coalition
are possible with protests, re-labelled as settlements to protesters and
intervenors, with the full approval of the judicial system. In addition,
members of a bidder coalition need not wait until the next procurement to punish a deviant member who over-bid the designated high
bidder (in terms of surplus) of the coalition to win a procurement.
The members can protest the award decision and, at a minimum,
impose significant costs on the deviant firm. 21 0 In other words, the
protest process provides a coalition with an immediate means by
which to deter, or at least partially correct, breakdowns in the collusive agreement.
Perhaps the most troubling feature of the protest process with
respect to bidder collusion is that it can encourage collusion among
bidders who would have acted non-cooperatively in the absence of
the process. Consider the following scenarios.
1. Assume that protests are not possible. Firms A, B and C are participating in a procurement as bidders. Acting non-cooperatively, firm
A would submit a bid that provided the government with a surplus of

210. Cf. Leslie Cauley, Cygnet Accuses Defense Firm of Bait-and-Switch, BALTIMORE
SUN, Sept. 9, 1989, at BI7. Cygnet was a subcontractor to General Dynamics, who was the

awardee on an Air Force computer contract. Cygnet was replaced by another subcontractor
and complained to the Air Force and GAO and sent a letter to a post-award protester,
arguing that the new subcontractor did not meet the specifications.
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Acting collusively with Firms B and C, where Firm A is the designated bidder for the coalition, Firm A would submit a bid providing
the government with surplus EA where L-A < SA. The collusive gain
would be shared among the three, with Firms B and C receiving cash
payments from Firm A of PB and Pc, respectively.
SA.

2. Next, assume that protests are possible. Now there is no communication among the three firms. However, Firm A exerts influence on
the PO so that ihe product evaluations in the last stage of the procurement process favor Firm A. Firms B and C observe and take note
of this influential activity. Firm A would have submitted a bid yielding the government a surplus of SA if the evaluation process were
unbiased, but now, with the guarantee of biased evaluations, submits
a bid yielding EA. After the award is made to Firm A, Firms B and
C protest on the grounds that the product evaluation phase of the procurement favored Firm A. Firm A settles with Firms B and C, making payments to them of PB and Pc, respectively.
There is no difference between the two scenarios in terms of the
winner, the winning bid, or the payments made to losing firms by the
winner. However, collusion does not need to be formally organized
when protests exist. In fact, almost any outsider to this procurement
would view the second scenario as an illustration of the success of
the protest process. Perhaps the Department of Justice can argue that
tacit collusion exists in the second scenario. But how is this case
made? Did firms B and C act suspiciously by not attempting to bias
the evaluation process in their favor?
It is important to note that cash and/or in-kind settlements provide the key for facilitating collusion. If the only settlement available
involved an unbiased reevaluation of the products, then the protest
process would provide far less to bidders as a means of coordinating
collusion.
An Intriguing Procurement and Disturbing Settlement
A controversial ADPTE was conducted by the Department of
Justice in 1985-86 to acquire computer equipment for the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (hereinafter "INS"). 2 1' The procurement

211. For a case study of this procurement see KELMAN, supra note 1, at 132-42.
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was plagued by charges that the RFP was unfairly biased toward IBM
and IBM-compatible machines, and that the evaluation criteria were
vague and confusing. 2" The solicitation attracted only two bidders:
IBM, who was the named awardee, and EDS, who protested on both
of these grounds.
Following the EDS protest, the situation began to deteriorate rapidly.
When a judge issued a temporary injunction to enjoin INS from
implementing the contract until the EDS protest could be heard,
Murray [PO at the Department of Justice] panicked. The Department
of Justice lawyers told him that the litigation could take over a
year, and he saw his fast track mired in mud. He took the lead in
negotiating an out-of-court settlement with EDS, whereby EDS was
chosen as the vendor but would supply the solution (and the hardware) that IBM had bid.2" 3
Thus, the procuring agency circumvented the private attorney
general role of the protester by arranging an in-kind settlement between the protester and the named awardee. But this is only half of
the matter. The procuring agency did not seem to understand that
instructing two competitors to work out their differences was synonymous with instructing them to collude.
Murray thought at the time of the agreement that the out-of-court
settlement would be no more expensive to INS than the IBM bid
was. IBM agreed to supply its products to EDS at prices even lower than they had bid in their proposal, and the price structure EDS
offered appeared to be favorable. But once the agreement was implemented, INS technical people came to feel that INS had been
misled; the prices INS ultimately paid for IBM equipment were
considerably higher than IBM would have charged, although EDS
committed to keeping the total present value price of the contract
unchanged, by lowering prices for hardware and maintenance in the
contract's outyears. In fact, the prices were so high that implementation of the contract was very slow because INS could not afford the
equipment. EDS also insisted on supplying various management
personnel that had been stipulated in the original RFP but which, in
INS's view, turned out to be unnecessary.2 4
This case study illustrates the essential need for regulation of the
settlement process by the GSBCA. Simply put, in the settlement

212.

Id. at 134, 137.

213. Id. at 140.
214. Id. at 140-41.
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process, IBM and EDS openly discussed and agreed on how to allocate resources to the INS. These discussions between competitive
bidders were instigated by the Department of Justice. Perhaps it is
mind-boggling that the Department of Justice would implicitly ask
competitive bidders to act collusively. Perhaps it is even more mindboggling that, ex post facto, the Department of Justice could be surprised that the prices paid for the procured commodities were so high
(i.e., the Department was surprised that the two firms reached a solution that maximized their joint profit).2 1 However, in our opinion,
the fact that the Department of Justice both instigated and was a
willing accomplice to a bidder conspiracy reflects not only the grave
nature of agency problems in the federal government but, in addition,
a blind commitment to the benefits of settlement in segments of the
legal community.
3. Standing
The determination of an optimal standing rule requires a difficult
balancing between the benefits of deterrence and the various costs of
protests. Liberal standing rules enhance both the deterrent power and
the costs of protests. Suppose a large number of firms are participating in a procurement. Finn 1 is the named awardee, Firm 2 finished
second, Firm 3 finished third, etc. Should Firm 3 be granted standing
as a protester? For many procurements, the Federal Circuit has ruled
that only Firm 2 has standing as protester. 21 6 Presumably, the logic
behind the decision is as follows: Firm 2 has the most to gain from a
successful protest. In fact, if Firm 2 does not protest, then Firm 3 has
nothing to gain since Firm 2 will be the new awardee if the protest is
upheld. Consequently, Firm 3 does not have standing as a protester
(at least not until Firm 1 has been eliminated through a successful

215. Ultimately, Congress intervened in the procurement after a critical GAO report, and
ordered the procurement cancelled. Id. at 141.
216. See United States v. IBM, 892 F.2d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Only the second lowest
bidder may challenge the award of ADP when the solicitation is not in dispute, the only
material difference between the bids is price, and the second lowest bid is responsive. The
prospect that a solicitation might be canceled is insufficient to give the requisite economic
interest for standing. Under influence of this decision, the Board has moved to restrict
standing in a recent case. See MCI Telecommunications Corp., GSBCA No. 9926-P, 89-2
B.C.A. (CCH)
21,650 (1989). In this case, MCI was denied standing to challenge an
FTS2000 award to AT&T. The majority said that the Board would not order the GSA to
reopen the solicitation to new offers (MCI had not made an offer) and, therefore, there was
no standing. The dissent stated that the Board should examine only status as offeror or potential offeror. Id
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protest by Firm 2, at which time Firm 3 takes on the role of Firm 2).
A critical point in assessing this logic is that the ranking of the
firms is determined by the procuring agency. If procurement officials
suffer from distorted incentives that lead to an inappropriate selection
of an awardee, then it is likely that these incentives will affect the
ranking of non-winning firms as well. For example, a bias toward
high technology items will typically lead to a different ranking of all
firms in a procurement from what would emerge from undistorted
surplus maximization. It is trivial to generate examples where a firm
ranked, say, tenth by undistorted surplus maximization would be
ranked second by a procurement official who suffered from a bias
toward high technology items. 217 Most importantly, these rankings
might be based upon information held privately by the procurement
official. In other words, it might not be possible for the GSBCA to
determine the "true" second ranked firm (i.e., by undistorted surplus
maximization) without discovery. This argument suggests that granting
standing to only Firrm 2 is inconsistent with a central objective of
procurement oversight-to deter and correct agency problems.
Only in the simplest of procurements is it sensible to argue that
a procurement official cannot distort the ranking of firms. For example, suppose the bids of firms are distinguishable only on the basis of
cost (i.e., a homogenous product is to be purchased in an indivisible
lump from one of a large number of competing firms). Given that all
of the information that is relevant to rank the firms is easily verified
by a court, it might seem appropriate to grant standing only to Firm
2. After all, Firm 5, for example, has nothing to gain from a protest
except, possibly, a settlement from the procuring agency or Firm 1.
The courts should not grant standing to firms whose sole potential
purpose is to use the costs and delays inherent in the judicial process
for gain. However, this argument presumes that all firms act noncooperatively. It ignores the incentives created for collusive bidding
by such rules of standing.
Consider a firm that will participate in a procurement where only
the second ranked firm will be granted standing as a protester. This
firm will have an incentive to take actions, ex ante, to prevent a
protest in the event that it is named as awardee. This could be accomplished by entering into an agreement with another firm whereby
the conspirator submits a bid that is slightly smaller than, but arbi-

217. Such an example could easily be produced within the framework of section ILD.
See Marshall et al., supra note 28.
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trarily close to, the bid of the awardee firm. If the first firm wins,
then the conspirator is ranked second. The threat of protest has been
eliminated, and procurement oversight has been dismantled. Perhaps
of even greater concern is the possibility that a procuring agency
would encourage such conspiratorial behavior by firms in order to
select, with impunity, a favored firm as awardee.
The potential for this kind of collusive behavior by firms is well
recognized in the federal government. We have been informed that a
certain federal agency uses a "rule of three" when selling a particular
commodity. 21 8 The "rule of three" requires that at least three bids
be obtained for every sale. This federal agency devotes significant resources to determining if two particular bidders have acted in unison
on a sale to generate a "third" bid that is insincere and noncompetitive and, therefore, effectively defeats the "rule of three." In other
words, this federal agency is concerned about the possibility of "shill"
bids to defeat a rule that was designed to enhance competition. Part
of our concern with granting standing to only second ranked firms in
federal procurements is the possibility that "shill" bids will be used to
defeat a mechanism of procurement oversight that exists to enhance
competition. It is important to note that the federal agency that administers the sales discussed above is not a direct beneficiary of these
sales. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the administrators
of this federal agency would never encourage collusion among bidders. On the other hand, procurement personnel recognize the costs
that will be borne by their agency in the event of a protest. Furthermore, protests might deter them from naming their preferred firm as
awardee, especially if they realize that this firm could never survive
as an awardee in the event of a protest. Simply put, the procuring
agency might foresee large potential gains from disabling the protest
process and, therefore, it might encourage collusive bidding by firms,
along the lines discussed above, when only Firm 2 has standing as a
protester. To deny the existence of such incentives is to deny a fundamental purpose of procurement oversight-to deter and correct
agency problems.
Suppose that "shill" bids cannot occur, that the award to Firm 1
is inappropriate for whatever reason, and that Firm 2 protests the
award decision. If Firm 1 offers a cash settlement to Firm 2 that is
acceptable, the Federal Circuit would not allow Firm 3 to protest the

218. In providing us with this information, a high level manager of this agency asked us
not to identify the agency in this Article.
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award decision even if it knows that the award is inappropriate. This
scenario raises three points. First, as noted earlier, except in extreme
cases, cash settlements defeat the private attorney general role of
protesters. Granting standing to firms other than Firm 2 leads to
fewer settlements since the cost of settling increases with the number
of additional firms that join the protest. Second, there is no reason to
believe that Firm 2 has any greater knowledge about problems with
the procurement than any other firm that participated. In fact, it
seems reasonable to assume that a firm's knowledge of problems with
a procurement is independent of, or only partially correlated with,
their rank as a bidder. A settlement with Firm 2 prevents Firm 3 (and
others) from revealing their privately held information regarding the
procurement. Third, if only Firm 2 has standing, then it may prefer
settlement to being named awardee, especially if being named awardee gives Firm 3 standing to protest the newly directed award. Again,
creating incentives for settlement strips away the power of the protest
process as a mechanism for procurement oversight.
Perhaps the argument in favor of granting standing to only Firm
2 stems from the costs associated with "insincere" protests. Suppose
Firm 5 wants to file a protest. The fact that it wants to do this implies that Firm 5 foresees greater profits from protesting than from
not protesting. Perhaps the source of these enhanced profits is solely
the increased chance of being named awardee. If this is the case, the
government should definitely grant standing to firms other than Firm
2. However, Firm 5 might see enhanced profits from a potential settlement with the procuring agency or Firm 1. If the award to Firm 1
is appropriate, a settlement might still occur with the procuring agency or the named awardee to avoid incurring the costs associated with
protest defense and procurement delay. This case seems to represent
the only drawback associated with granting standing to Firm 5 (i.e.,
those other than Firm 2). However, in light of our previous points,
this is more of an argument for compensating procuring agencies that
win protests than for limiting standing to a single firm.
4. Multiple Protesters and Intervenors
When a protest is filed, interested parties 19 may intervene either on the side of the protester or on the side of the agency. To
qualify as an intervenor, a party must meet the same "direct economic

219. To qualify as an intervenor of right, one must be an interested party. See Vanguard
Technologies Corp., GSBCA No. 10127-P, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,042 (1989).
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interest" test 2 ° imposed for protester standing, and must have similar protest grounds as the protester." Although named awardees
often intervene on the side of the agency, we are concerned only with
the policy implications of intervention on the side of the protester,
and we will use the term "intervenor" accordingly.
In general, being an intervenor has three major advantages relative to being the original protester. First, the intervenor incurs lower
legal expenses. Second, the intervenor has access to all of the same
information from discovery that is available to the original protester.
Third, it is difficult for a protester to enter into a cash or in-kind
settlement with the awardee or procuring agency without including the
intervenor in the settlement. Furthermore, should a change occur in
the procurement, by means of either settlement or court order, the
change will be more likely to address the interests of both the protester and the intervenor than would be the case if the latter had not
joined in the protest. Finally, it is important to note that an intervenor
on a protest can also file a protest of its own regarding separate issues.
The cost differential between taking the role of lead protester and
being an intervenor might create some hesitancy on the part of a firm
to file a protest when, instead, it can possibly wait to be an intervenor. This hesitancy, which is an increasing function of the cost
differential, might result in a diminished propensity for firms to file
protests and, thus, impair the effectiveness of the protest process for
deterring and correcting procurement problems. 222 This "free rider"

220.

See United States v. IBM, 892 F.2d 1006, 1011 (citing to Julie Research Lab., Inc.,

18,881 at 95,237 (1986), where the GSBCA
GSBCA No. 8070-P-R, 86-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
stated that "it is not enough that a citizen seeks to proceed here as a private attorney general
enforcing the public interest in the proper application of the procurement statutes and regulations." He must have a "direct economic interest."). A bidder who was not in the competitive
range and could not benefit from a favorable finding was ruled not to have a direct econom20,467 (1988). The
ic interest. See ATS, Inc., GSBCA No. 9338-P, 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
mere possibility that a procurement may be re-solicited is not enough to give a bidder a
direct economic interest. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. United States, 878 F.2d 362
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Federal Computer Corp., GSBCA No. 1113-P, 91-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
23,855 (1991).
221. See Vanguard Technologies Corp., GSBCA No. 10127-P, 89-3 B.C.A. (CCII)
22,042 (1989).
222. The "free rider" problem may also be aggravated by liberal standing rules. For
example, a pre-award protest that results in revisions of an RFP may benefit several firms.
Our view is that the problem is diminished by protest cost reimbursement and the advantages
of liberal standing rules, as stated above. For related issues, see Christopher Bliss & Barry
Nalebuff, Dragon-Slaying and Ballroom Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good, 25 3.
PUB. ECON. 1 (1984).
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problem is mitigated by the practice of compensating successful protesters and intervenors for legal expenses and bid preparation costs.
In addition, the problem is offset by the fact that multiple litigants strengthen the protest process in a number of ways. First, they
decrease the occurrence of cash and in-kind settlements.m- Suppose,
for example, that there is one protester and two intervenors. In this
circumstance, the cost of a cash settlement for an awardee or procuring agency may be three times what it would be if there were no
intervenors. Consequently, fewer cash or in-kind settlements will be
offered. Second, procuring agencies will be more likely to change the
procurement as a means of settlement. This point relates to the first
one mentioned. Suppose that, by relaxing a restrictive specification,
the procuring agency can include all three firms. With a single protester, the procuring agency might prefer a cash settlement to such a
change. However, with two intervenors and a consequent three-fold
increase in the settlement, the procuring agency might now find the
procurement change to be more advantageous. Third, it is much more
difficult to use the protest mechanism as a means of coordinating
collusion among bidders when non-colluding bidders can freely intervene in a protest by forming a coalition. The cash settlements that
constitute side-payments among members of the coalition must now
be paid to individuals who contributed nothing to the collusively obtained gain. This "leakage" of the collusive gain to outsiders reduces
the profitability of membership in a coalition and, consequently, inhibits their formation.
Currently, when two or more firms simultaneously file a protest
on a given procurement, their cases are typically consolidated. They
tend to share equally in legal expenses. This leads to a natural question: would it be beneficial to eliminate intervention? In other words,
would it be beneficial to eliminate a process in which litigants incurred asymmetric costs and the decision to litigate was made sequentially rather than simultaneously? The cost asymmetry has both an up
and a down side. The down side has been mentioned earlier-a waiting game can arise among potential protesters as firms try to take the
role of intervenor rather than the more expensive role of lead protester. However, given that a protest has been filed, reduced fees for
intervenors mean that more litigants will join the case, with the bene-

223. In response to a questionnaire sent to eighteen agency counsel by the American Bar
Association, "[a] few agency counsel stated a perception that intervenors had the ability to
'torpedo' a settlement." See A.B.A., supra note 48, at 61.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss1/1

62

Marshall et al.: The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procureme
1991]

PROCUREMENT OVERSIGHT BY PROTEST

fits and costs of multiple litigants as described above. The ability to
join a protest as an intervenor after an initial filing by a lead protester has a potential direct benefit and an indirect negative side effect.
Suppose one bidder understands the restrictiveness of a product evaluation test in a bid solicitation better than any other bidder. If intervention is not permitted, then only this bidder will appear as a protester. If intervention is permitted, then relatively uninformed firms
can take advantage of the lead protester's better information by attaching themselves to the protest. The indirect negative side effect is
that the lead protester will have a diminished incentive to invest in
the acquisition of information about the restrictiveness of a procurement if the returns to the acquisition of such information will be distributed to uninformed intervenors. Overall, multiple litigants offer
significant benefits to taxpayers; however, we cannot put forward a
definitive recommendation for altering the current manner in which
multiple litigants are handled at the Board.
F. Discretion and Oversight
In an analysis of federal computer procurements, Steven
Kelman2 4 argues that the process suffers, as compared to private
sector procurement, because POs lack discretion ' to use their business judgment. He believes that federal procurement policy embodied
in the rigid IFB or RFP process impedes efforts by POs to mimic
private sector practices .1 6 He attributes this rigidity to an unwarranted fear by members of Congress of discretionary decision-making
in federal agencies," and sees the protest process as abetting these
undesirable tendencies.228
According to Kelman, limits on discretion are costly because
aspects of quality that are difficult to measure 9 play little role in
source selection. As a consequence, firms are reluctant to make agency-specific investments toward educating the POs or to assist them in
obtaining solutions to their problems.' The private sector combats
these problems by relying on firms' reputations when making a

224. KELMAN, supra note 1.
225. Kelman acknowledges that the limits on discretion are a part of the procurement
culture rather than a legal mandate. See id. at 21.
226. Id. at 10.
227. Id. at 14.
228. Id. at 24.
229. See generally id.
230. Id. at 10.
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source selection. POs, however, are reluctant to depend upon such
criteria for fear of protest. Kelman also points to what we have called
overdeterrence as a problem in contract awards. Incumbents, particularly IBM, receive too few awards in the federal market.23 He believes this problem is caused partly by an overzealous application of
CICA.
There is a tension between the arguments advanced in this paper
and those in Kelman's work with respect to the role of discretion in
the procurement process. The fundamental issue is that, in many
cases, inappropriate discretion is not distinguishable from atpropriate
discretion, at least not without the intervention of an oversight mechanism such as a protest. To illustrate this point, consider a procurement in which the RFP clearly favors IBM. Perhaps IBM has provided excellent service on previous contracts, or has posed an innovative
solution to a problem confronted by the procuring agency. Alternatively, the PO may suffer from an appropriability problem. In such
situations, how can good discretion be disentangled from bad discretion? This identification issue is not trivial since a PO who is accused
of an appropriabilty problem will naturally plead his case in terms of
arguments that reflect sound business concerns. In the current environment, through de novo review, the GSBCA attempts to disentangle
bad discretion from good discretion by requiring the PO to provide
explicit justification for all challenged decisions. This is not, however,
inconsistent with Kelman's two main proposals for reform of the
procurement system-written justification for all procurement-related
decisions and multi-member evaluation panels. 2
The general concern that the protest process has over-corrected
alleged favoritism toward IBM is not supported by recent empirical
work. 3 Compared to the private sector, the government has an extensive investment in the old IBM 1400 series that cannot be easily
upgraded. 2 4 When IBM has a newer 360/370 mainframe at a federal site, a substantial incumbency advantage exists.35
So, how exactly do protests inhibit the use of discretion? Kelman

231. Seventy-eight percent of recent major contracts in the private sector went to incumbent firms, compared to fifty-eight percent in federal procurement; IBM received seventysix percent of contract awards from Fortune 1000 finns, compared to thirty-four percent in
the federal government. See id. at 7-8.
232. See Id. at 92.
233. Greenstein, Federal Computer Procurement, supra note 44, at 28.
234. Id. at 9-10.
235. Id.
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discusses the Contel Federal System, Inc. case,236 in which a PO
learned during the product evaluation stage that he had given too
little weight to the user-friendliness of a software package.237 When
the agency changed the evaluation criteria in selecting an awardee, a
protest was filed that was upheld by the Board.238 Obviously, userfriendliness is important. Obviously, a PO should be allowed to give
it significant weight. Obviously, good business practices that would be
perfectly acceptable in the private sector should not be condemned in
the public sector.
Contel illustrates three general points. First, although the PO
claimed that the issue was the user-friendliness of a software package,
how can taxpayers be reasonably sure that an agency problem did not
lead to the change in evaluation criteria? If decisions like this can go
unchallenged, then POs can award to any vendor they please, for any
reason they want, by claiming that they discovered, at the last moment, that their evaluation criteria were inadequate or unbalanced.
Again, appropriate discretion is very difficult to distinguish from
inappropriate discretion. In this context, it is important to note that
the FAR permits the PO to notify the vendors of minor changes in
evaluation criteria and to allow them a reasonable period of time to
submit new bids.
Second, firms that participated in the procurement as bidders did
so in good faith. Namely, they that believed the RFP represented the
computational service demands of the agency. Many firms that could
have bid user-friendly software did not do so because they thought it
to be unimportant to the agency. Not providing these firms with an
opportunity to revise their bids in light of the change in the agency's
evaluation criteria would greatly reduce the gains from competition.
Furthermore, the willingness of vendors to participate in future
procurements or to make agency-specific investments would be diminished when unannounced changes in evaluation criteria are permitted.
Third, in Contel it appears that the POs discovered the problem
of unfriendly software on their own. Kelman argues that part of the

236. Contel Fed. Sys., Inc., GSBCA No. 9743-P, 89-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 21,458 (1988).
237. KELMAN, supra note I, at 60.
238. Id. at 60 n.44. In this case, Xerox was the named awardee and Contel was the
protester (EDS was a third bidder, but had submitted a relatively uncompetitive bid). The
Board directed the award to Contel since Xerox had a non-compliant bid. In its decision the
Board informed the Air Force that nothing prohibited it from engaging in ex post award
negotiations with Contel in order to greatly enhance the friendliness of the word-processing
software.
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problem with lack of discretion is that vendors do not make agencyspecific investments-in this case the vendors did not notify the agency of the problem ex ante because there were insufficient rewards for
doing so. This raises a more fundamental tension. Increased competition reduces the rents for a winning vendor and, thereby, reduces the
willingness of any vendor to assist an agency in understanding how
its demand for computational services maps into hardware. However,
when the agency knows this mapping, reduced rents for the winning
vendor means more surplus for the government. Implicit in Kelman's
argument is that the gains from increased competition are outweighed
by the gains from agency-specific investments that vendors would
make in the face of reduced competition or even sole source
procurements. There are three issues here. First, for agency-specific
investments to be of high value, the vendor must have substantial
private information. But the mere fact that it has such information
means that the procuring agency is at a serious disadvantage in bargaining with it. So, how can the vendors's bargaining power be restrained while still inducing agency-specific investments? The answer
is competition. If it is important to leave rents available to induce
such investments, then the competition should be appropriately restricted. The words "full and open" do not imply that competition
should be extended to the detriment of taxpayers when restrictiveness
is important to obtain maximal surplus. Second, a commitment to
"full and open competition" also has the benefit of removing entry
barriers that keep new firms out of the federal ADPTE market. Casual observation suggests that the new firms in the marketplace, such as
SUN and Convex, are the technological innovators that can put stateof-the-art computing power and computing solutions into federal agencies. Third, federal agency personnel have punitive measures at their
disposal if they are dissatisfied with the performance of a vendor
(e.g., if the vendor's investment in agency-specific computational
issues is too low). POs can use the threat of contract termination to
assure that vendors provide promised support services and upgrades.
Most large hardware contracts are indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts that allow different offices within an agency to evaluate
product quality, and the experience, of other offices, before making a
purchase. 9 Various agencies have exercised contract options or
threatened to default to improve vendor services.'
239. See Gabig, supra note 49, at 52; KELMAN, supra note 1, at 143, 147 (reporting
that, after Customs purchased a network, agencies in the Treasury added to the network).
240. See KELMAN, supra note 1, at 129 (discussing a case in which a threat by Customs
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Finally, to the extent that protests are a successful method of
oversight, it should be possible to relax the strictures of the FAR.24
Different agencies may devise different procurement schemes that
yield efficient procurement selections. The need for uniformity is
diminished with protest oversight. Furthermore, the displacement of
audits by protest almost certainly creates incentives for the increased
use of discretion by POs. Accusations of malfeasance by an Inspector
General are more chilling on the use of discretion because there are
no formal channels of appeal.24 2 In contrast, protests provide POs
an opportunity to be heard and their agencies the opportunity to appeal.
III.

A.

CURRENT POLICY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Recent Proposalfor GSBCA Protest Revisions from the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy and the Department of the Treasury

The Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the Department of
the Treasury have recently engaged in a joint effort to suggest rule
changes at the GSBCA.243 Four proposals have emerged.
1. Filing Deadlines. This proposal would reduce the window for preaward protest to thirty days after issuance of the bid solicitation rather than maintain the current system, in which a pre-award protest can
be filed up to the deadline for receipt of bids.
2. Good Faith Standard of Conduct. This proposal would seek penalties for frivolous protests.
3. Motions for Summary Relief. This proposal would make explicit in
the rules that summary relief is available to protesters.
4. Motion Hearings. Again, this proposal would make it explicit in

to default led to better service); id. at 151-52 (discussing a case in which the VA threatened

to default and the vendor responded with improved
241. In fact, at least one commentator believes
in the DPAs that it issues. See Petrillo, supra note
tests has led POs to make greater use of subjective

service).
that the GSA allows too much discretion
132, at 62 (stating that the threat of proevaluation criteria).

242. This point was made to us by Leonard Suchanek, Chairman and Chief Judge of the
GSBCA.

243. Proposed Revisions to the Rules of the General Services Administration Board of
Contract Appeals, 48 C.F.R. § 6101 (1990).
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the rules that motion hearings can be conducted at the discretion of
the Board.
Motion for summary relief and motion hearings are current practices at the Board. These two proposals are innocuous as stated. The
first two proposals, however, are not innocuous. Consider the proposal
regarding filing deadlines. There are two arguments in favor of preaward filing deadlines. First, it is socially wasteful to have vendors
construct bid proposals in good faith only to find out, at the last
conceivable moment, that a major problem exists with the bid solicitation. A thirty-day window would permit bidders to "shoot at a
stationary target." Presumably, they would have greater incentives to
invest in the preparation of their bids, knowing that no last-minute alterations could occur. Second, incumbent suppliers that fear losing a
contract with a procuring agency in the current competitive bidding
can protest at the last moment in an attempt to delay award to a new
firm and, thereby, continue as the monopoly supplier to the agency
for an additional period of time.
However, there are strong arguments against the proposal for a
thirty-day window on filing deadlines. First, in many cases it may not
be obvious that components of a bid solicitation are jointly incompatible or excessively restrictive until the vendor actually begins construction of the bid proposal. Thirty days may not allow sufficient time
for the vendor community to recognize excessive restrictiveness. Second, a thirty-day window for filing at the Board would force many
vendors to litigate rather than to seek informal resolution of problems
with bid solicitations at the procuring agency. Creating impediments
to the resolution of honest mistakes and errors is contrary to the efficiency goal of the procurement process.
The second proposal recommends penalties for frivolous protesters. If it were possible to clearly distinguish frivolous protests from
"good" losing protests, then this would be a socially beneficial proposal. Frivolous protests might arise as firms strategically use the
delays in the protest process to their advantage. For example, an
incumbent supplier may protest, knowing that it has no just cause for
doing so, only to delay the award of a new contract to a competitor.
However, it is not conceivable that a clear line can be drawn between
frivolous and "good" losing protests. To penalize protests simply
because they happen to lose would greatly impair the deterrent effect
of protests. Furthermore, the establishment of penalties for frivolous
protests gives procuring agencies a threatening weapon that they can
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use against protesting firms. Even if an agency recognizes that a
losing protest was not frivolous, it may seek, through the courts, to
label the protest as frivolous. If significant costs are incurred by the
protester in its defense, then, even if the agency does not prevail,
future protests against the agency's procurements will be deterred by
the threat of such costly legal action.
Overall, the last two OFPP/Treasury proposals are innocuous.
The proposal on filing deadlines has arguments in support of it, but
there are sufficient arguments against it for us to suggest that it not
be implemented, at least until empirical investigations have been
completed to assess the relevant trade-offs. The proposal on penalizing frivolous protesters should be rejected. It will diminish the deterrent effect of the protest process.
B.

Other Current Policy Issues and Recommendations

By deterring and correcting agency problems, the GSBCA protest
goes a long way toward accomplishing the taxpayers' objective of
maximizing surplus. However, there is some room for improvement in
the process.
1. All cash or in-kind settlements should be contingent on the approval of a review board that has access to the information revealed in
discovery. The natural choice would be the GSBCA. Enforcing such a
review process on cash or in-kind settlements would be difficult.
However, the illegality of such settlements without Board approval
would prohibit firms from entering into legally binding agreements in
which cash or subcontracts were exchanged for a withdrawal of the
protest with prejudice. 2 "
2. In the event that a protest is upheld by the GSBCA, the procuring
agency should face stiffer penalties. An increase in the penalties
would enhance the deterrent power of protests. Firms would recognize
this increased deterrence and correctly believe that fewer procurements
were flawed; consequently, fewer protests would be filed. In addition,
244. In a recent study of the protest process, the A.B.A. recommended that cash settlements between firms and procuring agencies be prohibited, but that the GSBCA should
continue to build in appropriated settlement opportunities. A.B.A., supra note 48, at 72-73.
As noted in this Article, facilitating cash or in-kind settlements between firms would undermine the protest process as a method of procurement oversight. However, facilitating settlements that involve rewriting the bid solicitation or allowing greater objectivity with product
evaluation is obviously beneficial to taxpayers.
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there would be a diminished number of buy-off settlements.

5

3. Overdeterrence and fedmail result primarily from the fact that the
procuring agency faces significant protest costs even when it successfully defends itself. Both overdeterrence and fedmail can be reduced
by compensating procuring agencies for the costs incurred in a protest
when it is found that they have conducted procurements that are
consistent with surplus maximization.
4. The narrow definition of "interested party," formulated by the Federal Circuit to limit standing, should be overruled by Congress. All
firms that participated in a procurement should have standing as protesters and should be able to associate themselves with protests as
intervenors. The increased administrative costs would be small compared to the gains in deterrence and the tendency to undermine collusion.
There are three features of the protest process that are frequently
mentioned as candidates for change that we believe should not be
altered.
a.

It could be argued by procuring agencies that the
costs of protesting for firms are too low and, as a
result, there are too many protests. While it is true
that increasing the cost of protesting for firms
would result in fewer protests, it would also result
in a diminished deterrent effect. Since deterrence
inhibits POs from implementing their own objectives, rather than those of taxpayers, it would be
natural for POs to advocate this change in the
process. In our opinion, the deterrent effect of
protests should be strengthened, not by lowering
the cost of protests to firms, but by the means
described in suggestion 2 above.

b.

It could be argued that the "role and jurisdiction
of the GSBCA must be narrowed to allow the
focus of the project manager's decisions to be on

245. This finding emerges from the formal analysis in the paper by Marshall et al.,
supra note 74.
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quality and the creation of value for the taxpayers,
not on minimizing the possibility or risks of protests by competing vendors." 2 However, this
argument appears to have no basis. If a procuring
agency attempts to maximize the surplus of taxpayers, then protesting firms will always be turned
away by the GSBCA. If an agency spends its time
attempting to minimize protests, and this activity
has nothing to do with "creating value" for taxpayers, then there seems to be an obvious conclusion
to draw-the agency wants to accomplish a goal
that is different from surplus maximization for
taxpayers. But distorted objectives of procuring
agencies are a primary motivation for the existence
of procurement oversight by protest. In other
words, the argument contained in the quotation
above is a non sequitur.
c.

Finally, it has been suggested that subcontractors
on bids should have the right to protest at the
Board. There is no reason to believe that a subcontractor would have better information about the
problems with a procurement than the prime contractor. In other words, a subcontractor is not more
qualified than a prime contractor as a private attorney general. In addition, the subcontractor and
prime contractor can negotiate, ex ante, how protests will be handled. If the prime contractor will
not contract with the subcontractor to file a protest
on its behalf, then the subcontractor can choose to
attach itself to a prime contractor that is willing to
grant that concession. Furthermore, granting subcontractors access to the GSBCA would certainly
increase the quantity of litigation with few, if any,
apparent benefits for taxpayers. Overall, there
seems to be no valid reason to recommend granting subcontractors the right to file protests.

246. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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